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Abhinav Narain

dblp:137/5158 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 56% Network security · 44%
Computer networks
1 paper
Wireless networking · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Wireless networking
packet errors
0.212014
Deniable Liaisons · CCS 2014
Wireless networking
wireless security
0.212014
Deniable Liaisons · CCS 2014
Network security
covert channel
0.212014
Deniable Liaisons · CCS 2014
Privacy and data protection › privacy-enhancing technologies
deniable communication
0.212014
Deniable Liaisons · CCS 2014
Privacy and data protection › anonymity
unlinkability
0.112014
Deniable Liaisons · CCS 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

shared secret · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Deniable Liaisons
abstract
People sometimes need to communicate directly with one another while concealing the communication itself. Existing systems can allow users to achieve this level of privacy in the wide-area Internet, but parties who are in close proximity (e.g., a public square or coffee shop) may want a lightweight communications channel with similar properties. Today, covert exchanges in local settings typically require the exchange of physical media or involve other forms of direct communication (e.g., conversations, blind drops); most, if not all, of these exchanges are observable: in other words, even if the message exchanges are confidential, they are not covert or deniable. We construct a local communications channel that is unobservable to everyone except the parties exchanging messages. To do so, we take advantage of the ubiquitous phenomenon of packet corruption in wireless networks, which provide deniable cover for message exchange between parties within radio range. The communicating parties use a shared secret to differentiate truly corrupted frames from those that hide messages; to other parties, messages appear as corrupted wireless frames. We tackle the challenge of designing the observable corruption patterns to ensure that an observer can neither link sender and receiver of a hidden message(unlinkability), nor determine so much as the existence of any hidden message (deniability). We present the design and implementation of a prototype system that achieves these properties using off-the-shelf 802.11 hardware, evaluate its performance, and assess its resilience to various attacks.
Abhinav Narain, Nick Feamster, Alex C. Snoeren
CCS1