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Martin Goll

dblp:138/9022 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 67% Hardware security and side channels · 33%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › hardware trojan
hardware trojan detection
0.312018
Randomness Tests in Hostile Environments · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2018
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › random number generation
randomness testing
0.312018
Randomness Tests in Hostile Environments · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2018
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
random number generation
0.312018
Randomness Tests in Hostile Environments · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

NIST statistical test suite · 0.3DIEHARD battery of tests · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Randomness Tests in Hostile Environments
abstract
An acceptable way to assess the quality of an RNG (PRNG) is to apply a standard battery of statistical randomness tests to a sampled output. Such tests compare some observed properties of the sample to properties of a uniform distribution, with the hope to detect deviations from the expected behavior. Consider a (P)RNG that outputs M-bit values which, due to a failure or an attack, are coerced to a subset of {0, 1}Mof only 2nelements, for some n-n> 2-M, but the standard randomness tests do not necessarily detect this behavior. We show here deterministic M-bit sequences (M = 128) that belong to a subset of size 2n, but pass the DIEHARD Battery of Tests of Randomness [1] and the NIST Statistical Test Suite [2], even with a relatively small value of n = 29. To address the difficulty, we propose a detection method that is feasible even for large values of n (e.g., n = 64). As a practical example, we apply our method to rule out the existence of the speculative stealthy hardware Trojan that is discussed in [3].
Martin Goll, Shay Gueron
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.1