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Thurston H. Y. Dang

dblp:139/6635 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Operating systems · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Parallel and multicore computing · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Parallel and multicore computing
parallel programming models
0.612022
Practically Correct, Just-in-Time Shell Script Parallelization · OSDI 2022
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.312017
Oscar: A Practical Page-Permissions-Based Scheme for Thwarting Dangling Pointers · USENIX Security Symposium 2017
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Practically Correct, Just-in-Time Shell Script Parallelization
Konstantinos Kallas, Tammam Mustafa, Jan Bielak, Dimitris Karnikis, Thurston H. Y. Dang, Michael Greenberg 0002, Nikos Vasilakis
OSDI5
2017 Oscar: A Practical Page-Permissions-Based Scheme for Thwarting Dangling Pointers
Thurston H. Y. Dang, Petros Maniatis, David A. Wagner 0001
USENIX Security Symposium1
2015 The Performance Cost of Shadow Stacks and Stack Canaries
abstract
Control flow defenses against ROP either use strict, expensive, but strong protection against redirected RET instructions with shadow stacks, or much faster but weaker protections without. In this work we study the inherent overheads of shadow stack schemes. We find that the overhead is roughly 10% for a traditional shadow stack. We then design a new scheme, the parallel shadow stack, and show that its performance cost is significantly less: 3.5%. Our measurements suggest it will not be easy to improve performance on current x86 processors further, due to inherent costs associated with RET and memory load/store instructions. We conclude with a discussion of the design decisions in our shadow stack instrumentation, and possible lighter-weight alternatives.
Thurston H. Y. Dang, Petros Maniatis, David A. Wagner 0001
AsiaCCS1
2013 Symbolic software model validation
Cynthia Sturton, Rohit Sinha 0001, Thurston H. Y. Dang, Sakshi Jain, Michael McCoyd, Wei Yang Tan, Petros Maniatis, Sanjit A. Seshia, David A. Wagner 0001
MEMOCODE3