We propose a new design for a Translation Validation (TV) system geared towards practical use with modern optimizing compilers, such as LLVM. Unlike existing TV systems, which are custom-tailored for a particular sequence of transformations and a specific, common language for input and output programs, our design clearly separates the transformation-specific components from the rest of the system, and generalizes the transformation-independent components. Specifically, we present Keq, the first program equivalence checker that is parametric to the input and output language semantics and has no dependence on the transformation between the input and output programs. The Keq algorithm is based on a rigorous formalization, namely cut-bisimulation, and is proven correct. We have prototyped a TV system for the Instruction Selection pass of LLVM, being able to automatically prove equivalence for translations from LLVM IR to the MachineIR used in compiling to x86-64. This transformation uses different input and output languages, and as such has not been previously addressed by the state of the art. An experimental evaluation shows that Keq successfully proves correct the translation of over 90% of 4732 supported functions in GCC from SPEC 2006.

We present the most complete and thoroughly tested formal semantics of x86-64 to date. Our semantics faithfully formalizes all the non-deprecated, sequential user-level instructions of the x86-64 Haswell instruction set architecture. This totals 3155 instruction variants, corresponding to 774 mnemonics. The semantics is fully executable and has been tested against more than 7,000 instruction-level test cases and the GCC torture test suite. This extensive testing paid off, revealing bugs in both the x86-64 reference manual and other existing semantics. We also illustrate potential applications of our semantics in different formal analyses, and discuss how it can be useful for processor verification.

Monolithic operating system designs undermine the security of computing systems by allowing single exploits anywhere in the kernel to enjoy full supervisor privilege. The nested kernel operating system architecture addresses this problem by "nesting" a small isolated kernel within a traditional monolithic kernel. The "nested kernel" interposes on all updates to virtual memory translations to assert protections on physical memory, thus significantly reducing the trusted computing base for memory access control enforcement. We incorporated the nested kernel architecture into FreeBSD on x86-64 hardware while allowing the entire operating system, including untrusted components, to operate at the highest hardware privilege level by write-protecting MMU translations and de-privileging the untrusted part of the kernel. Our implementation inherently enforces kernel code integrity while still allowing dynamically loaded kernel modules, thus defending against code injection attacks. We also demonstrate that the nested kernel architecture allows kernel developers to isolate memory in ways not possible in monolithic kernels by introducing write-mediation and write-logging services to protect critical system data structures. Performance of the nested kernel prototype shows modest overheads: <1% average for Apache and 2.7% for kernel compile. Overall, our results and experience show that the nested kernel design can be retrofitted to existing monolithic kernels, providing important security benefits.