Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Andrea Di Pasquale

dblp:142/6236 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-7617-1215ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1Theory of computation · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 67% Network security · 33%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet architecture and protocols · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › attack strategy
man-in-the-middle attack
0.612022
A Formal Verification of ArpON - A Tool for Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Ethernet Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › protocol verification
model checking
0.612022
A Formal Verification of ArpON - A Tool for Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Ethernet Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2022
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
protocol verification
0.612022
A Formal Verification of ArpON - A Tool for Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Ethernet Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2022
Internet architecture and protocols › link-layer protocols
address resolution protocol
0.212022
A Formal Verification of ArpON - A Tool for Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Ethernet Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2022
Internet architecture and protocols › local area network
ethernet
0.212022
A Formal Verification of ArpON - A Tool for Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Ethernet Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

model checking · 1.1formal verification · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Ensuring cybersecurity for industrial networks: A solution for ARP-based MITM attacks
abstract
The increased adoption of the Internet Protocol (IP) in ICSs has made these systems vulnerable to the same security risks that are present in traditional IT environments. The legacy nature of ICSs and their unique operational requirements make them vulnerable to security threats that are different from those in IT environments. In this paper, we describe a protocol, named ArpON, which is able to wipe out in quasi real time any ARP cache poisoning attempt, thus making it ineffective. Contrarily to solutions presented in the literature for contrasting ARP cache poisoning, ArpON incurs in low operational costs, is backward compatible, transparent to the ARP protocol and does not use any HW feature nor cryptography functionality. We also model and validate ArpON in the OMNET[Formula: see text] network simulator. The simulation results show that ArpON is effective in avoiding ARP poisoning, and its communication overhead is negligible with respect to classical ARP protocol.
Danilo Bruschi, Andrea Di Pasquale, Andrea Lanzi, Elena Pagani
J. Comput. Secur.2
2022 A Formal Verification of ArpON - A Tool for Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Ethernet Networks
abstract
Since the nineties, the Man-in-The-Middle (MITM) attack has been one of the most effective strategies adopted for compromising information security in network environments. In this article, we focus our attention on ARP cache poisoning, which is one of the most well-known and more adopted techniques for performing MITM attacks in Ethernet local area networks. More precisely, we will prove that, in network environments with at least one malicious host in the absence of cryptography, an ARP cache poisoning attack cannot be avoided. Subsequently, we advance ArpON, an efficient and effective solution to counteract ARP cache poisoning, and we use a model-checker for verifying its safety property. Our main finding, in accordance with the above impossibility result, is that the only event that compromises the safety of ArpON is a cache poisoning that nevertheless is removed by ArpON itself after a very short period, thus making it practically infeasible to perpetrate an ARP cache poisoning attack on network hosts where ArpON is installed.
Danilo Bruschi, Andrea Di Pasquale, Silvio Ghilardi, Andrea Lanzi, Elena Pagani
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.2
2017 Formal Verification of ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) Through SMT-Based Model Checking - A Case Study -
Danilo Bruschi, Andrea Di Pasquale, Silvio Ghilardi, Andrea Lanzi, Elena Pagani
IFM2
2013 Kriging interpolation on GB-SAR data to quickly update topographic maps in areas prone to slope instability
abstract
This work presents the result of an experiment aiming to derive high resolution Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) of areas spanning at most few squared kilometers by means of Ground-Based Synhetic Aperture Radar (GBSAR) interferometry. Spatially dense maps of topographic height are obtaned by exploiting pixels of SAR interferograms characterized by high values of coherence and applying kriging interpolation to generate regular-grid maps.
Pietro Guccione, Mariantonietta Zonno, Giovanni Nico, Marco Nicoletti, Andrea Di Pasquale
IGARSS5