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Sina Dehghani

dblp:144/2816 · DBLP profile ↗
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11ranked-venue papers
7as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0002-4625-3199ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 7 · 6 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
10 papers
Approximation and online algorithms · 44% Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 32% Mathematical optimization · 13%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational social science and digital humanities · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Multi-agent systems · 100%

Topics — the 22 heaviest of 25, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Approximation and online algorithms
online algorithms
1.142018
Greedy Algorithms for Online Survivable Network Design · ICALP 2018
Stochastic k-Server: How Should Uber Work? · ICALP 2017
Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design · SODA 2016
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › zero-sum game
colonel blotto game
0.522017
Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game · AAAI 2017
From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games · AAAI 2016
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › social choice
computational social choice
0.512021
Computational Analyses of the Electoral College: Campaigning Is Hard But Approximately Manageable · AAAI 2021
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
online network design
0.522016
Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design · SODA 2016
Online Weighted Degree-Bounded Steiner Networks via Novel Online Mixed Packing/Covering · ICALP 2016
Approximation and online algorithms › approximation algorithms › network design
steiner forest
0.522016
Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design · SODA 2016
Online Weighted Degree-Bounded Steiner Networks via Novel Online Mixed Packing/Covering · ICALP 2016
Graph algorithms and graph theory › graph algorithms
connectivity
0.312018
Greedy Algorithms for Online Survivable Network Design · ICALP 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
fair division
0.312018
Envy-free Chore Division for An Arbitrary Number of Agents · SODA 2018
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
indivisible chores allocation
0.312018
Envy-free Chore Division for An Arbitrary Number of Agents · SODA 2018
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
k-server problem
0.312017
Stochastic k-Server: How Should Uber Work? · ICALP 2017
Mathematical optimization
linear programming
0.312017
Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game · AAAI 2017
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
competitive analysis
0.212016
Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design · SODA 2016
Approximation and online algorithms › approximation algorithms › network design
degree-bounded network design
0.212016
Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design · SODA 2016
Mathematical optimization
integer programming
0.212016
Online Weighted Degree-Bounded Steiner Networks via Novel Online Mixed Packing/Covering · ICALP 2016
Mathematical optimization › linear programming
mixed packing and covering
0.212016
Online Weighted Degree-Bounded Steiner Networks via Novel Online Mixed Packing/Covering · ICALP 2016
Approximation and online algorithms › approximation algorithms
network design
0.212016
Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design · SODA 2016
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
price of anarchy
0.212016
Price of Competition and Dueling Games · ICALP 2016
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
zero-sum game
0.212016
From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games · AAAI 2016
Computational social science and digital humanities › social network analysis › information diffusion
influence maximization
0.212015
Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions · INFOCOM 2015
Computational social science and digital humanities
opinion dynamics
0.212015
Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions · INFOCOM 2015
Computational social science and digital humanities
social network analysis
0.212015
Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions · INFOCOM 2015
Approximation and online algorithms
approximation algorithms
0.212015
Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions · INFOCOM 2015
Mathematical optimization
combinatorial optimization
0.212015
Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions · INFOCOM 2015

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

greedy algorithm · 0.6rounding · 0.5discrete protocols · 0.3bounded protocols · 0.3linear programming relaxation · 0.3linear extension techniques · 0.3ellipsoid method · 0.3separation oracle · 0.2primal-dual method · 0.2polytope reduction · 0.2simulation on social networks · 0.2polynomial-time algorithm · 0.2inapproximability proofs · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Computational Analyses of the Electoral College: Campaigning Is Hard But Approximately Manageable
Sina Dehghani, Hamed Saleh, Saeed Seddighin, Shang-Hua Teng
AAAI1
2018 Greedy Algorithms for Online Survivable Network Design
abstract
In an instance of the network design problem, we are given a graph G=(V,E), an edge-cost function c:E -> R^{>= 0}, and a connectivity criterion. The goal is to find a minimum-cost subgraph H of G that meets the connectivity requirements. An important family of this class is the survivable network design problem (SNDP): given non-negative integers r_{u v} for each pair u,v in V, the solution subgraph H should contain r_{u v} edge-disjoint paths for each pair u and v. While this problem is known to admit good approximation algorithms in the offline case, the problem is much harder in the online setting. Gupta, Krishnaswamy, and Ravi [Gupta et al., 2012] (STOC'09) are the first to consider the online survivable network design problem. They demonstrate an algorithm with competitive ratio of O(k log^3 n), where k=max_{u,v} r_{u v}. Note that the competitive ratio of the algorithm by Gupta et al. grows linearly in k. Since then, an important open problem in the online community [Naor et al., 2011; Gupta et al., 2012] is whether the linear dependence on k can be reduced to a logarithmic dependency. Consider an online greedy algorithm that connects every demand by adding a minimum cost set of edges to H. Surprisingly, we show that this greedy algorithm significantly improves the competitive ratio when a congestion of 2 is allowed on the edges or when the model is stochastic. While our algorithm is fairly simple, our analysis requires a deep understanding of k-connected graphs. In particular, we prove that the greedy algorithm is O(log^2 n log k)-competitive if one satisfies every demand between u and v by r_{uv}/2 edge-disjoint paths. The spirit of our result is similar to the work of Chuzhoy and Li [Chuzhoy and Li, 2012] (FOCS'12), in which the authors give a polylogarithmic approximation algorithm for edge-disjoint paths with congestion 2. Moreover, we study the greedy algorithm in the online stochastic setting. We consider the i.i.d. model, where each online demand is drawn from a single probability distribution, the unknown i.i.d. model, where every demand is drawn from a single but unknown probability distribution, and the prophet model in which online demands are drawn from (possibly) different probability distributions. Through a different analysis, we prove that a similar greedy algorithm is constant competitive for the i.i.d. and the prophet models. Also, the greedy algorithm is O(log n)-competitive for the unknown i.i.d. model, which is almost tight due to the lower bound of [Garg et al., 2008] for single connectivity.
Sina Dehghani, Soheil Ehsani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat, Saeed Seddighin
ICALP1
2018 Envy-free Chore Division for An Arbitrary Number of Agents
abstract
Chore division, introduced by Gardner in 1970s [10], is the problem of fairly dividing a chore among n different agents. In particular, in an envy-free chore division, we would like to divide a negatively valued heterogeneous object among a number of agents who have different valuations for different parts of the object, such that no agent envies another agent. It is the dual variant of the celebrated cake cutting problem, in which we would like to divide a desirable object among agents. There has been an extensive amount of study and effort to design bounded and envy-free protocols/algorithms for fair division of chores and goods, such that envy-free cake cutting became one of the most important open problems in 20-th century mathematics according to Garfunkel [11]. However, despite persistent efforts, due to delicate nature of the problem, there was no bounded protocol known for cake cutting even among four agents, until the breakthrough of Aziz and Mackenzie [2], which provided the first discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for cake cutting for four agents. Afterward, Aziz and Mackenzie [3], generalized their work and provided an envy-free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents to settle a significant and longstanding open problem. However, there is much less known for chore division. Unfortunately, there is no general method known to apply cake cutting techniques to chore division. Thus, it remained an open problem to find a discrete and bounded envy-free chore division protocol even for four agents. In this paper, we provide the first discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for chore division for an arbitrary number of agents. We produce major and powerful tools for designing protocols for the fair division of negatively valued objects. These tools are based on structural results and important observations. In general, we believe these structures and techniques may be useful not only in chore division but also in other fairness problems. Interestingly, we show that applying these techniques simplifies Core Protocol provided in Aziz and Mackenzie [3].
Sina Dehghani, Alireza Farhadi 0001, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Hadi Yami
SODA1
2017 Faster and Simpler Algorithm for Optimal Strategies of Blotto Game
abstract
In the Colonel Blotto game, which was initially introduced by Borel in 1921, two colonels simultaneously distribute their troops across different battlefields.The winner of each battlefield is determined independently by a winner-take-all rule. The ultimate payoff of each colonel is the number of battlefields he wins. This game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications such as the U.S presidential election, innovative technology competitions, advertisements, etc. There have been persistent efforts for finding the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. After almost a century Ahmadinejad, Dehghani, Hajiaghayi, Lucier, Mahini, and Seddighin provided a poly-time algorithm for finding the optimal strategies. They first model the problem by a Linear Program (LP) with exponential number of constraints and use Ellipsoid method to solve it. However, despite the theoretical importance of their algorithm, it ishighly impractical. In general, even Simplex method (despite its exponential running-time) performs better than Ellipsoid method in practice. In this paper, we provide the first polynomial-size LP formulation of the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. We use linear extension techniques. Roughly speaking, we project the strategy space polytope to a higher dimensional space, which results in a lower number of facets for the polytope.We use this polynomial-size LP to provide a novel, simpler and significantly faster algorithm for finding the optimal strategies for the Colonel Blotto game. We further show this representation is asymptotically tight in terms of the number of constraints. We also extend our approach to multi-dimensional Colonel Blotto games, and implement our algorithm to observe interesting properties of Colonel Blotto; for example, we observe the behavior of players in the discrete model is very similar to the previously studied continuous model.
Soheil Behnezhad, Sina Dehghani, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin
AAAI2
2017 Stochastic k-Server: How Should Uber Work?
abstract
In this paper we study a stochastic variant of the celebrated $k$-server problem. In the k-server problem, we are required to minimize the total movement of k servers that are serving an online sequence of $t$ requests in a metric. In the stochastic setting we are given t independent distributions in advance, and at every time step i a request is drawn from P_i. Designing the optimal online algorithm in such setting is NP-hard, therefore the emphasis of our work is on designing an approximately optimal online algorithm. We first show a structural characterization for a certain class of non-adaptive online algorithms. We prove that in general metrics, the best of such algorithms has a cost of no worse than three times that of the optimal online algorithm. Next, we present an integer program that finds the optimal algorithm of this class for any arbitrary metric. Finally by rounding the solution of the linear relaxation of this program, we present an online algorithm for the stochastic k-server problem with an approximation factor of $3$ in the line and circle metrics and factor of O(log n) in general metrics. In this way, we achieve an approximation factor that is independent of k, the number of servers. Moreover, we define the Uber problem, motivated by extraordinary growth of online network transportation services. In the Uber problem, each demand consists of two points -a source and a destination- in the metric. Serving a demand is to move a server to its source and then to its destination. The objective is again minimizing the total movement of the k given servers. It is not hard to show that given an alpha-approximation algorithm for the k-server problem, we can obtain a max{3,alpha}-approximation algorithm for the Uber problem. Motivated by the fact that demands are usually highly correlated with the time (e.g. what day of the week or what time of the day the demand is arrived), we study the stochastic Uber problem. Using our results for stochastic k-server we can obtain a 3-approximation algorithm for the stochastic Uber problem in line and circle metrics, and a O(log n)-approximation algorithm for a general metric of size n. Furthermore, we extend our results to the correlated setting where the probability of a request arriving at a certain point depends not only on the time step but also on the previously arrived requests.
Sina Dehghani, Soheil Ehsani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat, Saeed Seddighin
ICALP1
2016 From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games
abstract
We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games.Many natural zero-sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in the well-studied Colonel Blotto game (introduced by Borel in 1921), players must divide a pool of troops among a set of battlefields with the goal of winning (i.e., having more troops in) a majority. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S presidential election, to innovative technology competitions, toadvertisement, to sports.However, because of the size of the strategy space, standard methods for computing equilibria of zero-sum games fail to be computationally feasible.Indeed, despite its importance, only few solutions for special variants of the problem are known. In this paper we show how to compute equilibria of Colonel Blotto games. Moreover, our approach takes the form of a general reduction: to find a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, it suffices to design a separation oracle for the strategy polytope of any bilinear game that is payoff-equivalent. We then apply this technique to obtain the first polytime algorithms for a variety of games. In addition to Colonel Blotto, we also show how to compute equilibria in an infinite-strategy variant called the General Lotto game; this involves showing how to prune the strategy space to a finite subset before applying our reduction. We also consider the class of dueling games, first introduced by Immorlica et al. (2011). We show that our approach provably extends the class of dueling games for which equilibria can be computed: we introduce a new dueling game, the matching duel, on which prior methods fail to be computationally feasible but upon which our reduction can be applied.
AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Hamid Mahini, Saeed Seddighin
AAAI2
2016 Online Weighted Degree-Bounded Steiner Networks via Novel Online Mixed Packing/Covering
abstract
We design the first online algorithm with poly-logarithmic competitive ratio for the edge-weighted degree-bounded Steiner forest (EW-DB-SF) problem and its generalized variant. We obtain our result by demonstrating a new generic approach for solving mixed packing/covering integer programs in the online paradigm. In EW-DB-SF, we are given an edge-weighted graph with a degree bound for every vertex. Given a root vertex in advance, we receive a sequence of terminal vertices in an online manner. Upon the arrival of a terminal, we need to augment our solution subgraph to connect the new terminal to the root. The goal is to minimize the total weight of the solution while respecting the degree bounds on the vertices. In the offline setting, edge-weighted degree-bounded Steiner tree (EW-DB-ST) and its many variations have been extensively studied since early eighties. Unfortunately, the recent advancements in the online network design problems are inherently difficult to adapt for degree-bounded problems. In particular, it is not known whether the fractional solution obtained by standard primal-dual techniques for mixed packing/covering LPs can be rounded online. In contrast, in this paper we obtain our result by using structural properties of the optimal solution, and reducing the EW-DB-SF problem to an exponential-size mixed packing/covering integer program in which every variable appears only once in covering constraints. We then design a generic integral algorithm for solving this restricted family of IPs. As mentioned above, we demonstrate a new technique for solving mixed packing/covering integer programs. Define the covering frequency k of a program as the maximum number of covering constraints in which a variable can participate. Let m denote the number of packing constraints. We design an online deterministic integral algorithm with competitive ratio of O(k*log(m)) for the mixed packing/covering integer programs. We prove the tightness of our result by providing a matching lower bound for any randomized algorithm. We note that our solution solely depends on m and k. Indeed, there can be exponentially many variables. Furthermore, our algorithm directly provides an integral solution, even if the integrality gap of the program is unbounded. We believe this technique can be used as an interesting alternative for the standard primal-dual techniques in solving online problems.
Sina Dehghani, Soheil Ehsani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat, Harald Räcke, Saeed Seddighin
ICALP1
2016 Price of Competition and Dueling Games
abstract
We study competition in a general framework introduced by Immorlica, Kalai, Lucier, Moitra, Postlewaite, and Tennenholtz and answer their main open question. Immorlica et al. considered classic optimization problems in terms of competition and introduced a general class of games called dueling games. They model this competition as a zero-sum game, where two players are competing for a user’s satisfaction. In their main and most natural game, the ranking duel, a user requests a webpage by submitting a query and players output an ordering over all possible webpages based on the submitted query. The user tends to choose the ordering which displays her requested webpage in a higher rank. The goal of both players is to maximize the probability that her ordering beats that of her opponent and gets the user's attention. Immorlica et al. show this game directs both players to provide suboptimal search results. However, they leave the following as their main open question: "does competition between algorithms improve or degrade expected performance?" (see the introduction for more quotes) In this paper, we resolve this question for the ranking duel and a more general class of dueling games. More precisely, we study the quality of orderings in a competition between two players. This game is a zero-sum game, and thus any Nash equilibrium of the game can be described by minimax strategies. Let the value of the user for an ordering be a function of the position of her requested item in the corresponding ordering, and the social welfare for an ordering be the expected value of the corresponding ordering for the user. We propose the price of competition which is the ratio of the social welfare for the worst minimax strategy to the social welfare obtained by asocial planner. Finding the price of competition is another approach to obtain structural results of Nash equilibria. We use this criterion for analyzing the quality of orderings in the ranking duel. Although Immorlica et al. show that the competition leads to suboptimal strategies, we prove the quality of minimax results is surprisingly close to that of the optimum solution. In particular, via a novel factor-revealing LP for computing price of anarchy, we prove if the value of the user for an ordering is a linear function of its position, then the price of competition is at least 0.612 and bounded above by 0.833. Moreover we consider the cost minimization version of the problem. We prove, the social cost of the worst minimax strategy is at most 3 times the optimal social cost. Last but not least, we go beyond linear valuation functions and capture the main challenge for bounding the price of competition for any arbitrary valuation function. We present a principle which states that the lower bound for the price of competition for all 0-1 valuation functions is the same as the lower bound for the price of competition for all possible valuation functions. It is worth mentioning that this principle not only works for the ranking duel but also for all dueling games. This principle says, in any dueling game, the most challenging part of bounding the price of competition is finding a lower bound for 0-1 valuation functions. We leverage this principle to show that the price of competition is at least 0.25 for the generalized ranking duel.
Sina Dehghani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Saeed Seddighin
ICALP1
2016 Online Degree-Bounded Steiner Network Design
abstract
We initiate the study of degree-bounded network design problems in the online setting. The degree-bounded Steiner tree problem – which asks for a subgraph with minimum degree that connects a given set of vertices – is perhaps one of the most representative problems in this class. This paper deals with its well-studied generalization called the degree-bounded Steiner forest problem where the connectivity demands are represented by vertex pairs that need to be individually connected. In the classical online model, the input graph is given offline but the demand pairs arrive sequentially in online steps. The selected subgraph starts off as the empty subgraph, but has to be augmented to satisfy the new connectivity constraint in each online step. The goal is to be competitive against an adversary that knows the input in advance. The standard techniques for solving degree-bounded problems often fall in the category of iterative and dependent rounding techniques. Unfortunately, these rounding methods are inherently difficult to adapt to an online settings since the underlying fractional solution may change dramatically in between the rounding steps. Indeed, this might be the very reason that despite many advances in the online network design paradigm in the past two decades, the natural family of degree-bounded problems has remained widely open. In this paper, we design an intuitive greedy-like algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of O(log n) where n is the number of vertices. We show that no (randomized) algorithm can achieve a (multiplicative) competitive ratio o(log n); thus our result is asymptotically tight. We further show strong hardness results for the group Steiner tree and the edge-weighted variants of degree-bounded connectivity problems. Fürer and Raghavachari resolved the offline variant of degree-bounded Steiner forest in their paper in SODA'92. Since then, the family of degree-bounded network design problems has been extensively studied in the literature resulting in the development of many interesting tools and numerous papers on the topic. We hope that our approach and its dual analysis, paves the way for solving the online variants of the classical problems in this family of problems.
Sina Dehghani, Soheil Ehsani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat
SODA1
2015 Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items
Mohammad Hossein Bateni 0001, Sina Dehghani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin
ESA2
2015 Forming external behaviors by leveraging internal opinions
abstract
People make decisions and express their opinions according to their communities. A natural idea for controlling the diffusion of a behavior is to find influential people, and employ them to spread a desired behavior. We investigate an influencing problem when individuals' behaviors are affected by their friends in an opinion formation process. Our goal is to design efficient algorithms for finding opinion leaders such that changing their opinions has a great impact on the overall external behaviors in the society. We study directed social networks and define a set of problems like maximizing the sum of individuals' behaviors or maximizing the number of individuals whose external behaviors are above a threshold. We discuss the complexity of the defined problems and design polynomial-time optimum algorithms for the non NP-hard variants of them. We also propose polynomial-time approximation algorithms with guaranteed performances and prove inapproximability results for the NP-hard variants of these problems. Furthermore, we run simulations on real-world social networks and show our proposed algorithm outperforms the classical algorithms such as degree-based algorithm, closeness-based algorithm, and pagerank-based algorithm.
AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, Saeed Seddighin, Sadra Yazdanbod
INFOCOM2