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James Goppert

dblp:144/8552 · also James M. Goppert · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-2044-4931ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Robot navigation and mapping · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Robotics › Robot navigation and mapping
multi-robot navigation
0.912025
Automated Discovery of Semantic Attacks in Multi-Robot Navigation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Cyber-physical and IoT security › deception attacks
semantic attack
0.912025
Automated Discovery of Semantic Attacks in Multi-Robot Navigation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

automated attack discovery · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Automated Discovery of Semantic Attacks in Multi-Robot Navigation Systems
Doguhan Yeke, Kartik Anand Pant, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Hyungsub Kim, James Goppert, Inseok Hwang 0002, Antonio Bianchi, Z. Berkay Celik
USENIX Security Symposium5
2024 MIXED-SENSE: A Mixed Reality Sensor Emulation Framework for Test and Evaluation of UAVs Against False Data Injection Attacks
abstract
We present a high-fidelity Mixed Reality sensor emulation framework for testing and evaluating the resilience of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) against false data injection (FDI) attacks. The proposed approach can be utilized to assess the impact of FDI attacks, benchmark attack detector performance, and validate the effectiveness of mitigation/reconfiguration strategies in single-UAV and UAV swarm operations. Our Mixed Reality framework leverages high-fidelity simulations of Gazebo and a Motion Capture system to emulate proprioceptive (e.g., GNSS) and exteroceptive (e.g., camera) sensor measurements in real-time. We propose an empirical approach to faithfully recreate signal characteristics such as latency and noise in these measurements. Finally, we illustrate the efficacy of our proposed framework through a Mixed Reality experiment consisting of an emulated GNSS attack on an actual UAV, which (i) demonstrates the impact of false data injection attacks on GNSS measurements and (ii) validates a mitigation strategy utilizing a distributed camera network developed in our previous work. Our open-source implementation is available at https://github.com/CogniPilot/mixed_sense
Kartik Anand Pant, Li-Yu Lin, Jaehyeok Kim, Worawis Sribunma, James Goppert, Inseok Hwang 0002
IROS5