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Raghed El-Bardan

dblp:145/3308 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
2 papers
Physical-layer communications · 48% Network optimization and economics · 44% Wireless networking · 9%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Coding theory · 100%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network optimization and economics › game theory › non-cooperative game
bayesian game
0.212016
Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Physical-layer communications › modulation
frequency-shift keying
0.212016
Permutation Trellis Coded Multi-Level FSK Signaling to Mitigate Primary User Interference in Cognitive Radio Networks · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Network optimization and economics › game theory
game-theoretic networking
0.212016
Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Physical-layer communications
modulation
0.212016
Permutation Trellis Coded Multi-Level FSK Signaling to Mitigate Primary User Interference in Cognitive Radio Networks · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Physical-layer communications
power allocation
0.212016
Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Network optimization and economics
resource allocation
0.212016
Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Coding theory › error-correcting codes › coded modulation
trellis-coded modulation
0.212016
Permutation Trellis Coded Multi-Level FSK Signaling to Mitigate Primary User Interference in Cognitive Radio Networks · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Wireless networking
cognitive radio
0.122016
Permutation Trellis Coded Multi-Level FSK Signaling to Mitigate Primary User Interference in Cognitive Radio Networks · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016
Physical-layer communications › interference
jamming
0.112016
Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer · IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

viterbi decoder · 0.5bit error rate analysis · 0.5nash equilibrium · 0.2bayesian game · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2016 Strategic Power Allocation With Incomplete Information in the Presence of a Jammer
abstract
In this paper, distributed competitive interactions between a secondary user (SU) transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer are investigated using a game-theoretic framework under physical interference restrictions, power budget constraints, and incomplete knowledge of channel gains. In this game, the SU transmitter is expected to choose its power strategy with the objective of satisfying a minimum signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the corresponding receiver. Similarly, the jammer's objective is to strategically allocate its power so that the SINR constraint of the SU is not satisfied. Due to a lack of complete information, this strategic power allocation problem between the two players is modeled as a Bayesian game for which the self-enforcing strategies of the SU transmitter-receiver pair and the jammer are analyzed. Furthermore, probability distributions are employed by the corresponding players to model the incomplete nature of the game. The solution of the game corresponds to Nash equilibria points. Equilibrium analysis is carried out by considering the mixed strategy solution space and numerical examples are presented for illustration.
Raghed El-Bardan, Swastik Brahma, Pramod K. Varshney
IEEE Trans. Commun.1
2016 Permutation Trellis Coded Multi-Level FSK Signaling to Mitigate Primary User Interference in Cognitive Radio Networks
abstract
We employ Permutation Trellis Code (PTC) based multi-level Frequency Shift Keying signaling to mitigate the impact of Primary Users (PUs) on the performance of Secondary Users (SUs) in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). The PUs are assumed to be dynamic in that they appear intermittently and stay active for an unknown duration. Our approach is based on the use of PTC combined with multi-level FSK modulation so that an SU can improve its data rate by increasing its transmission bandwidth while operating at low power and not creating destructive interference for PUs. We evaluate system performance by obtaining an approximation for the actual Bit Error Rate (BER) using properties of the Viterbi decoder and carry out a thorough performance analysis in terms of BER and throughput. The results show that the proposed coded system achieves i) robustness by ensuring that SUs have stable throughput in the presence of heavy PU interference and ii) improved resiliency of SU links to interference in the presence of multiple dynamic PUs.
Raghed El-Bardan, Engin Masazade, Onur Ozdemir, Yunghsiang Sam Han, Pramod K. Varshney
IEEE Trans. Commun.1