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Meifang Zeng

dblp:147/1374 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-6216-3970ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Recommender systems · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Graph learning · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Recommender systems › trustworthy recommendation
shilling attack
0.712023
Practical Cross-System Shilling Attacks with Limited Access to Data · AAAI 2023
Security and privacy of machine learning
recommender system attack
0.712023
Practical Cross-System Shilling Attacks with Limited Access to Data · AAAI 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

self-supervised learning · 2.0fine-tuning · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Shilling Black-Box Recommender Systems by Learning to Generate Fake User Profiles
abstract
Due to the pivotal role of recommender systems (RS) in guiding customers toward the purchase, there is a natural motivation for unscrupulous parties to spoof RS for profits. In this article, we study shilling attacks where an adversarial party injects a number of fake user profiles for improper purposes. Conventional Shilling Attack approaches lack attack transferability (i.e., attacks are not effective on some victim RS models) and/or attack invisibility (i.e., injected profiles can be easily detected). To overcome these issues, we present learning to generate fake user profiles (Leg-UP), a novel attack model based on the generative adversarial network. Leg-UP learns user behavior patterns from real users in the sampled "templates" and constructs fake user profiles. To simulate real users, the generator in Leg-UP directly outputs discrete ratings. To enhance attack transferability, the parameters of the generator are optimized by maximizing the attack performance on a surrogate RS model. To improve attack invisibility, Leg-UP adopts a discriminator to guide the generator to generate undetectable fake user profiles. Experiments on benchmarks have shown that Leg-UP exceeds state-of-the-art shilling attack methods on a wide range of victim RS models. The source code of our work is available at: https://github.com/XMUDM/ShillingAttack.
Chen Lin 0001, Si Chen 0011, Meifang Zeng, Min Gao 0001, Hui Li 0057
IEEE Trans. Neural Networks Learn. Syst.3
2023 Practical Cross-System Shilling Attacks with Limited Access to Data
abstract
In shilling attacks, an adversarial party injects a few fake user profiles into a Recommender System (RS) so that the target item can be promoted or demoted. Although much effort has been devoted to developing shilling attack methods, we find that existing approaches are still far from practical. In this paper, we analyze the properties a practical shilling attack method should have and propose a new concept of Cross-system Attack. With the idea of Cross-system Attack, we design a Practical Cross-system Shilling Attack (PC-Attack) framework that requires little information about the victim RS model and the target RS data for conducting attacks. PC-Attack is trained to capture graph topology knowledge from public RS data in a self-supervised manner. Then, it is fine-tuned on a small portion of target data that is easy to access to construct fake profiles. Extensive experiments have demonstrated the superiority of PC-Attack over state-of-the-art baselines. Our implementation of PC-Attack is available at https://github.com/KDEGroup/PC-Attack.
Meifang Zeng, Ke Li 0005, Bingchuan Jiang, Liujuan Cao, Hui Li 0057
AAAI1