Traditional approaches to secret key establishment based on common randomness have been based on certain restrictive assumptions, such as considering the available common randomness to consist of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) repetitions of correlated random variables. Unfortunately, the i.i.d assumption does not generally reflect the conditions of real-life scenarios. For this reason, the current paper investigates the key-establishment potential of a more pragmatic model, in which all parties have access to imperfect information about a common source modeled as a Markov chain. Each party's information thus comes in the form of a hidden Markov model and, since the different parties share the same underlying Markov chain, we call the overall model a sibling hidden Markov model (SHMM). This paper studies upper and lower bounds on the secret key capacity for various types of SHMM. The difficulty of the problem emerges from its prohibitive computational cost. To address this obstacle, we represent the joint probability of the observations as the L1norm of a Markov random matrix, and use its convergence to a Lyapunov exponent.

Secret key establishment from common randomness has been traditionally investigated under cartain limiting assumptions, of which the most ubiquitous appears to be that the information available to all parties comes in the form of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of some correlated random variables. Unfortunately, models employing the i.i.d assumption are often not accurate representations of real scenarios. A more capable model would represent the available information as correlated hidden Markov models (HMMs), based on the same underlying Markov chain. Such a model accurately reflects the scenario where all parties have access to imperfect observations of the same source random process, exhibiting a certain time dependency. In this paper, we derive a computationally-efficient asymptotic converse bound for the secret key capacity of the correlated-HMM scenario. The main obstacle, not only for our model, but also for other non-i.i.d cases, is the computational complexity. We address this by converting the initial bound to a product of Markov random matrices, and using recent results regarding its convergence to a Lyapunov exponent. The methods developed in the paper are easily extensible to derive a secret-key capacity lower bound.

Establishing secret common randomness between two or multiple devices in a network resides at the root of communication security. In its most frequent form of key establishment, the problem is traditionally decomposed into a randomness generation stage (randomness purity is subject to employing often costly true random number generators) and an information-exchange agreement stage, which relies either on public-key infrastructure or on symmetric encryption (key wrapping). In this paper, we propose a secret-common-randomness establishment algorithm for ad hoc networks, which works by harvesting randomness directly from the network routing metadata, thus achieving both pure randomness generation and (implicitly) secret-key agreement. Our algorithm relies on the route discovery phase of an ad hoc network employing the dynamic source routing protocol, is lightweight, and requires relatively little communication overhead. The algorithm is evaluated for various network parameters in an OPNET ad hoc network simulator. Our results show that, in just 10 min, thousands of secret random bits can be generated network-wide, between different pairs in a network of 50 users.