We present Aggios, a scalable and privacy preserving proxy voting system designed for frequent and large-scale elections such as Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO), when storing votes on the bulletin board is expensive. To this end, Aggios introduces ‘aggregators’: entities to which voters delegate their votes, and who then post their batched proofs on the public ledger. Aggios achieves strong integrity guarantees: only authorized voters can vote, votes are counted correctly, voters are assured their vote is counted.

Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables arbitrary computation on encrypted data, while distributing the decryption capability across multiple parties. A primary application of interest is low-communication multi-party computation (MPC), which benefits from a fast and secure threshold FHE decryption protocol.

Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in congestion control. Unfortunately, the overwhelmingly large design space along with the increasingly diverse range of application environments makes evaluating congestion control protocols a daunting task. Researchers often use simulation and experiments to examine the performance of designs in specific contexts, but this gives limited insight into the more general properties of these schemes and provides no information about the inherent limits of congestion control designs, e.g., which properties are simultaneously achievable. To complement simulation and experimentation, we advocate a principled framework for reasoning about congestion control protocols. We report on our initial steps in this direction, which was inspired by the axiomatic approach from social choice theory and game theory. We consider several natural requirements ("axioms") from congestion control protocols -- e.g., efficient resource-utilization, loss-avoidance, fairness, stability, and TCP-friendliness -- and investigate which combinations of these can be achieved within a single design. Thus, our framework allows us to investigate the fundamental tradeoffs between desiderata, and to identify where existing and new congestion control architectures fit within the space of possible outcomes. We believe that our results are but a first step in the axiomatic exploration of congestion control and leave the reader with exciting directions for future research.

Cloud computing platforms provide computational resources (CPU, storage, etc.) for running users' applications. Often, the same application can be implemented in various ways, each with different resource requirements. Taking advantage of this flexibility when allocating resources to users can both greatly benefit users and lead to much better global resource utilization. We develop a framework for fair resource allocation that captures such implementation tradeoffs by allowing users to submit multiple “resource demands”. We present and analyze two mechanisms for fairly allocating resources in such environments: the Lexicographically-Max-Min-Fair (LMMF) mechanism and the Nash-Bargaining (NB) mechanism. We prove that NB has many desirable properties, including Pareto optimality and envy freeness, in a broad variety of environments whereas the seemingly less appealing LMMF fares better, and is even immune to manipulations, in restricted settings of interest.

After more than two decades of evolution, TCP and its end host based modifications can still suffer from severely degraded performance under real-world challenging network conditions. The reason, as we observe, is due to TCP family's fundamental architectural deficiency, which hardwires packet-level events to control responses and ignores emprical performance. Jumping out of TCP lineage's architectural deficiency, we propose Performance-oriented Congestion Control (PCC), a new congestion control architecture in which each sender controls its sending strategy based on empirically observed performance metrics. We show through preliminary experimental results that PCC achieves consistently high performance under various challenging network conditions.