The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is used to distribute routing information between autonomous systems (ASes), is a critical component of the Internet's routing infrastructure. It is highly vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks, due to the lack of a secure means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of BGP control traffic. This paper describes a secure, scalable, deployable architecture (S-BGP) for an authorization and authentication system that addresses most of the security problems associated with BGP. The paper discusses the vulnerabilities and security requirements associated with BGP, describes the S-BGP countermeasures, and explains how they address these vulnerabilities and requirements. In addition, this paper provides a comparison of this architecture to other approaches that have been proposed, analyzes the performance implications of the proposed countermeasures, and addresses operational issues.

The analysis of the test and measurement of TCP/IP performance over the Atlantic Packet Satellite Network (SATNET) is described. Both the methodology and tools as well as the results and their analysis are discussed. Because of the Internetwork nature of the environment, the tests were designed to allow the SATNET Measurement Taskforce to look at the effects of each component of the end-to-end path, e.g., local networks, gateways, SATNET, and protocol layers. Results are given for the IP service provided by SATNET as a function of offered load and for TCP behavior as a function of offered load and the underlying IP service.