Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Neil Evans
dblp:15/66
· DBLP profile ↗
12ranked-venue papers
7as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 7 · 5 first-author · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 6 · 3 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 2 · 1 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Authentication and access control · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Requirements engineering and software design · 50% Programming languages and type systems · 50% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Requirements engineering and software design
formal specification |
0.1 | 1 | 2006 | A Proposal for Records in Event-B · FM 2006 |
Programming languages and type systems › type systems
records |
0.1 | 1 | 2006 | A Proposal for Records in Event-B · FM 2006 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
event-b · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Polynomial Analysis of Modular Arithmetic
Thomas Seed, Chris Coppins, Andy King, Neil Evans |
SAS | 4 |
| 2020 | Reducing Bit-Vector Polynomials to SAT Using Gröbner Bases
Thomas Seed, Andy King, Neil Evans |
SAT | 3 |
| 2015 | Confidence Analysis for Nuclear Arms Control: SMT Abstractions of Bayesian Belief NetworksabstractHow to reduce, in principle, arms in a verifiable manner that is trusted by two or more parties is a hard but important problem. Nations and organisations that wish to engage in such arms control verification activities need to be able to design procedures and control mechanisms that capture their trust assumptions and let them compute pertinent degrees of belief. Crucially, they also will need methods for reliably assessing their confidence in such computed degrees of belief in situations with little or no contextual data. We model an arms control verification scenario with what we call constrained Bayesian Belief Networks (cBBN). A cBBN represents a set of Bayesian Belief Networks by symbolically expressing uncertainty about probabilities and scenario-specific constraints that are not represented by a BBN. We show that this abstraction of BBNs can mitigate well against the lack of prior data. Specifically, we describe how cBBNs have faithful representations within a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver, and that these representations open up new ways of automatically assessing the confidence that we may have in the degrees of belief represented by cBBNs. Furthermore, we show how to perform symbolic sensitivity analyses of cBBNs, and how to compute global optima of under-specified probabilities of particular interest to decision making. SMT solving also enables us to assess the relative confidence we have in two cBBNs of the same scenario, where these models may share some information but express some aspects of the scenario at different levels of abstraction. Paul Beaumont, Neil Evans, Michael Huth 0001, Tom Plant |
ESORICS (1) | 2 |
| 2015 | Software Development and Authentication for Arms Control Information Barriers
Neil Evans |
FM | 1 |
| 2008 | Automatic Generation of CSP || B Skeletons from xUML Models
Edward Turner, Helen Treharne, Steve A. Schneider, Neil Evans |
ICTAC | 4 |
| 2008 | Applying CSP || B to information systems
Neil Evans, Helen Treharne, Régine Laleau, Marc Frappier |
Softw. Syst. Model. | 1 |
| 2007 | Interactive tool support for CSP || B consistency checkingabstractAbstract CSP || B is an integration of two well known formal notations: CSP and B. It provides a method for modelling systems with both complex state (described in B machines) and control flow (described as CSP processes). Consistency checking within this approach verifies that a controller process never calls a B operation outside its precondition. Otherwise the behaviour of the operation cannot be predicted. In previous work, this check was carried out by manually decomposing the model before preprocessing the CSP processes to perform a hand-written weakest precondition proof. In this paper, a framework is described that mechanises consistency checking in a theorem prover and removes the need for preprocessing. This work is based on an existing PVS embedding of the CSP traces model, but it is extended by introducing a notion of state so that the interaction between processes and machines can be analysed. Numerous rules have been defined (and proved) which enable consistency checking and decomposition via PVS proof. These rules also formally justify the relaxation of previous constraints on CSP || B architectures, thereby widening the scope of CSP || B modelling. The PVS embedding and rules presented in this paper are not only applicable to CSP || B specifications, but to other combined approaches which use a non-blocking semantics for the state-based operations. Neil Evans, Helen Treharne |
Formal Aspects Comput. | 1 |
| 2006 | A Proposal for Records in Event-B
Neil Evans, Michael J. Butler |
FM | 1 |
| 2005 | Chunks: Component Verification in CSP||B
Steve A. Schneider, Helen Treharne, Neil Evans |
IFM | 3 |
| 2005 | Investigating a file transfer protocol using CSP and B
Neil Evans, Helen Treharne |
Softw. Syst. Model. | 1 |
| 2004 | How to Verify Dynamic Properties of Information Systems
Neil Evans, Helen Treharne, Régine Laleau, Marc Frappier |
SEFM | 1 |
| 2000 | Analysing Time Dependent Security Properties in CSP Using PVS
Neil Evans, Steve A. Schneider |
ESORICS | 1 |