Integrating subsystems developed by different manufacturers is a challenging task. Nevertheless, in fields like Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), it is imperative for vehicles and infrastructure to constantly communicate. The proposed method models elements from a Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) of each subsystem using SysML. Then it applies compatibility conditions to the exported model to generate an output compatibility statement. This statement indicates whether the subsystems are compatible from a security perspective or not. The method enables subsystems to assess their potential for secure integration allowing for independent development by manufacturers. We implement the method and evaluate it on an industrial use case to showcase the method's ability to determine the security compatibility of two subsystems.

In the automotive domain, feature-based software architecture is a widely used software design method to produce cost efficient and reusable software. With increasing complexity of automotive systems and the shift towards automated driving, safety and security measures become even more crucial for these systems. However, safety and security functionalities can undermine each other if they interact in unintended ways.We propose the novel method FIISS for automatic identification of interactions between safety and security features in UML models. We evaluate our implementation of the method by applying it to a real-world component for autonomous driving. We show that the method is able to identify unintended interactions while providing only few false positive findings. Thus, we see that our method can be applied to real-world UML system designs without modifying the underlying models and without applying specialized UML profiles.

In this paper, we present a novel notion of compositional non-interference for component-based systems. Our specification mechanism for non-interference properties is based on equivalence relations, catering for a precise formalization of declassified information. It takes assumptions on the environment into consideration. We also present a new notion of non-interference for services provided by a component and prove that a component only providing non-interferent services is itself non-interferent. Using these properties, secure information flow in a component-based system can be proved by separately analyzing each of the services that are provided by the components. As a result, we gain modular, precise, and reusable information-flow specifications for component-based systems.