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Jason L. Harman

dblp:151/6928 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0002-6606-3050ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Multi-agent systems · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › agent modeling
agent behavior modeling
0.512021
Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice › voting rules
approval voting
0.512021
Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice
computational social choice
0.512021
Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting · AAAI 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice
strategic voting
0.512021
Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting · AAAI 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

behavioral experiments · 0.5behavioral experiment · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting
abstract
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting and, in scenarios such as committee or board elections, employing voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent submits a ballot consisting of approvals for as many candidates as they wish, and winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-k candidates receiving the most approvals. In many scenarios, an agent may manipulate the ballot they submit in order to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain situations, agents may use heuristics instead of incurring the additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them. In this paper, we examine voting behavior in single-winner and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with varying degrees of uncertainty using behavioral data obtained from Mechanical Turk. We find that people generally manipulate their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal manipulation. There are a number of predictive models of agent behavior in the social choice and psychology literature that are based on cognitively plausible heuristic strategies. We show that the existing approaches do not adequately model our real-world data. We propose a novel model that takes into account the size of the winning set and human cognitive constraints; and demonstrate that this model is more effective at capturing real-world behaviors in multi-winner approval voting scenarios.
Jaelle Scheuerman, Jason L. Harman, Nicholas Mattei, K. Brent Venable
AAAI2
2016 Choice adaptation to increasing and decreasing event probabilities
Samuel J. Cheyette, Emmanouil Konstantinidis, Jason L. Harman, Cleotilde Gonzalez
CogSci3
2014 Dynamics of human trust in recommender systems
abstract
The trust that humans place on recommendations is key to the success of recommender systems. The formation and decay of trust in recommendations is a dynamic process influenced by context, human preferences, accuracy of recommendations, and the interactions of these factors. This paper describes two psychological experiments (N=400) that evaluate the evolution of trust in recommendations over time, under personalized and non-personalized recommendations by matching or not matching a participant's profile. Main findings include: Humans trust inaccurate recommendations more than they should; when recommendations are personalized, they lose trust in inaccurate recommendations faster than when recommendations are not personalized; and participants report less trust and lower overall ratings of personalized but inaccurate recommendations compared to not-personalized inaccurate recommendations. We make connections to the possible implications of these psychological findings to the design of recommender systems.
Jason L. Harman, John O'Donovan, Tarek F. Abdelzaher, Cleotilde Gonzalez
RecSys1