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Hamed Okkhravi

dblp:153/5753 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
0000-0003-1450-3744ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 56% Hardware security and side channels · 44%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.212014
Information Leaks Without Memory Disclosures: Remote Side Channel Attacks on Diversified Code · CCS 2014
Systems and software security
software diversity
0.212014
Information Leaks Without Memory Disclosures: Remote Side Channel Attacks on Diversified Code · CCS 2014
Systems and software security › exploitation
code reuse attack
0.112014
Information Leaks Without Memory Disclosures: Remote Side Channel Attacks on Diversified Code · CCS 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

side-channel analysis · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Information Leaks Without Memory Disclosures: Remote Side Channel Attacks on Diversified Code
abstract
Code diversification has been proposed as a technique to mitigate code reuse attacks, which have recently become the predominant way for attackers to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities. As code reuse attacks require detailed knowledge of where code is in memory, diversification techniques attempt to mitigate these attacks by randomizing what instructions are executed and where code is located in memory. As an attacker cannot read the diversified code, it is assumed he cannot reliably exploit the code.
Jeff Seibert, Hamed Okkhravi, Eric Söderström
CCS2