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Chris S. Lin

dblp:153/9238 · also Shaopeng Chris Lin, Shaopeng Lin · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0009-3592-8670ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 83% Systems and software security · 17%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
3 papers
Memory systems · 94% GPUs and heterogeneous computing · 6%

Topics — the 11 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
fault attacks
1.922026
GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer · SP 2026
GPUHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on GPU Memories are Practical · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks › fault injection attack
rowhammer attack
1.922026
GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer · SP 2026
GPUHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on GPU Memories are Practical · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Memory systems
DRAM
1.222026
QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority Queues · HPCA 2025
GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer · SP 2026
Hardware security and side channels
GPU security
1.012026
GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer · SP 2026
Systems and software security › operating system security
privilege escalation
1.012026
GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer · SP 2026
Memory systems › DRAM
per row activation counting
0.912025
QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority Queues · HPCA 2025
Memory systems › DRAM › rowhammer
rowhammer mitigation
0.912025
QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority Queues · HPCA 2025
Memory systems › DRAM
rowhammer
0.312026
GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer · SP 2026
GPUs and heterogeneous computing
GPU memory
0.312025
GPUHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on GPU Memories are Practical · USENIX Security Symposium 2025
Memory systems
memory controller
0.312025
QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority Queues · HPCA 2025
Memory systems › DRAM
refresh management
0.312025
QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority Queues · HPCA 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

rowhammer bit-flips · 2.0page table manipulation · 2.0priority queue · 0.9ALERT back-off protocol · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 GPUBreach: Privilege Escalation Attacks on GPUs Using Rowhammer
abstract
NVIDIA GPUs with GDDR memories have been shown susceptible to Rowhammer-based bit-flips, similar to CPUs. However, Rowhammer exploits on GPUs have been limited to injecting untargeted bit-flips in victim data like weights of machine learning models, to degrade model accuracy, unlike CPU exploits shown capable of privilege escalation. In this paper, we demonstrate that GPU Rowhammer exploits can be as potent as CPU Rowhammer attacks. By exploiting the GPU page table management to identify when and where new page tables are allocated, we enable an unprivileged user CUDA kernel of one process to use RowHammer bit-flips to gain access to the GPU memory of other processes or co-tenants via targeted tampering of such page-tables resident on the GPU memory. Using this newly found primitive, we demonstrate the first GPU-side privilege escalation attacks, leaking secret data such as cryptographic keys from cuPQC libraries, and even tampering with the model's GPU assembly code to degrade models more stealthily than previous attacks. We further demonstrate that GPU-side privilege escalation can lead to CPU-side privilege escalation, defeating the protections provided by the IOMMU, enabling a malicious user-level program with GPU access to gain root shell and system-wide control, even in a non-multi-tenant setting.
Chris S. Lin, Yuqin Yan, Guozhen Ding, Joyce Qu, Joseph Zhu, David Lie, Gururaj Saileshwar
SP1
2025 QPRAC: Towards Secure and Practical PRAC-based Rowhammer Mitigation using Priority Queues
abstract
JEDEC has introduced the Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC) framework for DDR5 and future DRAMs to enable precise counting of DRAM row activations. PRAC enables a holistic mitigation of Rowhammer attacks even at ultra-low Rowhammer thresholds. PRAC uses an Alert Back-Off (ABO) protocol to request the memory controller to issue Rowhammer mitigation requests. However, recent PRAC implementations are either insecure or impractical. For example, Panopticon, the inspiration for PRAC, is rendered insecure if implemented per JEDEC’s PRAC specification. On the other hand, the recent UPRAC proposal is impractical since it needs oracular knowledge of the ‘top- N ‘ activated DRAM rows that require mitigation.This paper provides the first secure, scalable, and practical RowHammer solution using the PRAC framework. The crux of our proposal is the design of a priority-based service queue (PSQ) for mitigations that prioritizes pending mitigations based on activation counts to avoid the security risks of prior solutions. This provides principled security using the reactive ABO protocol. Furthermore, we co-design our PSQ, with opportunistic mitigation on Refresh Management (RFM) operations and proactive mitigation during refresh (REF), to limit the performance impact of ABO-based mitigations. QPRAC provides secure and practical RowHammer mitigation that scales to Rowhammer thresholds as low as 71 while incurring a $0.8 \%$ slowdown for benign workloads, which further reduces to $0 \%$ with proactive mitigations.
Jeonghyun Woo, Chris S. Lin, Prashant J. Nair, Aamer Jaleel, Gururaj Saileshwar
HPCA2
2025 GPUHammer: Rowhammer Attacks on GPU Memories are Practical
Chris S. Lin, Joyce Qu, Gururaj Saileshwar
USENIX Security Symposium1
2015 External and internal learning for single-image super-resolution
abstract
Super-resolution (SR) problem still faces a challenge of wisely utilizing diverse learned priors to recover the lost details in low resolution images. In this work, we propose a novel method using low rank decomposition which integrates diverse priors learned from external and internal learning to construct SR image. The proposed method first applies an external dictionary learning to get the meta-detail that is commonly shared among images, and then introduces an internal prior learning to learn the local self-similarity (local structure) that is shared in the image. Both are essential but different priors for SR image construction. With these priors, a bank of preliminary HR images are obtained but with estimation errors and noise. To restrain the errors and noise, we consider these HR images as a high dimension data in dimension reduction problem, and solve it using a low rank decomposition. Experimental results show the proposed method preserves image details effectively, also outperforms state-of-the-arts in both visual and quantitative assessments, especially in dealing with the noise.
Shuang Wang 0001, Chris S. Lin, Xuefeng Liang, Bo Yue, Licheng Jiao
ICIP2
2014 Multilayer feature learning for polarimetric synthetic radar data classification
abstract
Features are important for polarimetric synthetic aperture radar (PolSAR) image classification. Various methods focus on extracting feature artificially. Compared with them, we have developed a method to learn feature automatically. The method is based on deep learning which can learn multilayer features. In this paper, stacked sparse autoencoder (SAE) as one of the deep learning models is applied as a useful strategy to achieve the goal. For improving the classification result, we use a small amount of labels to fine-tuning the parameters of the proposed method. Finally, a real PolSAR dataset is used to verify the effectiveness. Experiment result confirms that the proposed method provides noteworthy improvements in classification accuracy and visual effect.
Huiming Xie, Shuang Wang 0001, Kun Liu 0011, Chris S. Lin, Biao Hou
IGARSS4