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Christopher Kane

dblp:155/8099 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Authentication and access control · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Software-defined and programmable networks · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control
access control
0.212014
OperationCheckpoint: SDN Application Control · ICNP 2014
Software-defined and programmable networks › SDN controller
northbound interface
0.112014
OperationCheckpoint: SDN Application Control · ICNP 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

permissions system · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 OperationCheckpoint: SDN Application Control
abstract
One of the core properties of Software Defined Networking (SDN) is the ability for third parties to develop network applications. This introduces increased potential for innovation in networking from performance-enhanced to energy-efficient designs. In SDN, the application connects with the network via the SDN controller. A specific concern relating to this communication channel is whether an application can be trusted or not. For example, what information about the network state is gathered by the application? Is this information necessary for the application to execute or is it gathered for malicious intent? In this paper we present an approach to secure the northbound interface by introducing a permissions system that ensures that controller operations are available to trusted applications only. Implementation of this permissions system with our Operation Checkpoint adds negligible overhead and illustrates successful defense against unauthorized control function access attempts.
Sandra Scott-Hayward, Christopher Kane, Sakir Sezer
ICNP2