We study solution discovery, where the goal is to obtain a feasible solution to a problem from an initial configuration by a bounded sequence of local moves. In many applications, however, the graph that defines which vertex sets are feasible is not the same as the graph that governs how tokens, agents, or resources may move. Existing models such as token sliding and token jumping typically do not distinguish the problem graph and the movement graph. Motivated by this mismatch, we introduce a directed weighted two-graph model that cleanly separates feasibility from movement. A problem graph specifies the desired combinatorial objects, while a movement graph specifies admissible relocations and their costs. This yields a flexible framework that captures asymmetry, heterogeneous movement constraints, and weighted transitions, while subsuming classical discovery models as special cases. We investigate this model through Path Discovery and Shortest Path Discovery, where the task is to realize a vertex set containing an s-t-path or a shortest s-t-path in the problem graph. These problems are particularly natural in applications, since directed and weighted shortest paths are among the most fundamental algorithmic primitives. At the same time, previous work has already shown that discovery can be computationally hard even when the underlying optimization problem is easy. Our results show that this phenomenon persists, and becomes especially rich, in the two-graph setting. We obtain a detailed complexity picture, identifying tractable cases as well as strong hardness results.

The dynamics of real-world applications and systems require efficient methods for improving infeasible solutions or restoring corrupted ones by making modifications to the current state of a system in a restricted way. We propose a new framework of solution discovery via reconfiguration for constructing a feasible solution for a given problem by executing a sequence of small modifications starting from a given state or configuration. Our framework integrates and formalizes different aspects of classical local search, reoptimization, and combinatorial reconfiguration. We exemplify our framework on a multitude of fundamental combinatorial problems, namely Vertex Cover , Independent Set , Dominating Set , and Coloring . We study the classical as well as the parameterized complexity of the solution discovery variants of those problems and explore the boundary between tractable and intractable instances.

A decade ago, Gerhard Woeginger posed an open problem that became well-known as “Woeginger’s Hiking Problem”: Consider a group of n people that want to go hiking; everyone expresses preferences over the size of their hiking group in the form of an interval between 1 and n. Is it possible to efficiently assign the n people to a set of hiking subgroups so that every person approves the size of their assigned subgroup? The problem is also known as efficiently deciding if an instance of an anonymous Hedonic Game with interval approval preferences admits a wonderful partition. We resolve the open problem in the affirmative by presenting an O(n5) time algorithm for Woeginger’s Hiking Problem. Our solution is based on employing a dynamic programming approach for a specific rectangle stabbing problem from computational geometry. Moreover, we propose natural, more demanding extensions of the problem, e.g., maximizing the number of satisfied participants and variants with single-peaked preferences, and show that they are also efficiently solvable. Last but not least, we employ our solution to efficiently compute a partition that maximizes the egalitarian welfare for anonymous single-peaked Hedonic Games.

In the recently introduced framework of solution discovery via reconfiguration [Fellows et al., ECAI 2023], we are given an initial configuration of $k$ tokens on a graph and the question is whether we can transform this configuration into a feasible solution (for some problem) via a bounded number $b$ of small modification steps. In this work, we study solution discovery variants of polynomial-time solvable problems, namely Spanning Tree Discovery, Shortest Path Discovery, Matching Discovery, and Vertex/Edge Cut Discovery in the unrestricted token addition/removal model, the token jumping model, and the token sliding model. In the unrestricted token addition/removal model, we show that all four discovery variants remain in P. For the toking jumping model we also prove containment in P, except for Vertex/Edge Cut Discovery, for which we prove NP-completeness. Finally, in the token sliding model, almost all considered problems become NP-complete, the exception being Spanning Tree Discovery, which remains polynomial-time solvable. We then study the parameterized complexity of the NP-complete problems and provide a full classification of tractability with respect to the parameters solution size (number of tokens) $k$ and transformation budget (number of steps) $b$. Along the way, we observe strong connections between the solution discovery variants of our base problems and their (weighted) rainbow variants as well as their red-blue variants with cardinality constraints.

Abstract Opinion spreading in a society decides the fate of elections, the success of products, and the impact of political or social movements. A prominent model to study opinion formation processes is due to Hegselmann and Krause. It has the distinguishing feature that stable states do not necessarily show consensus, i.e., the population of agents might not agree on the same opinion. We focus on the social variant of the Hegselmann–Krause model. There arenagents, which are connected by a social network. Their opinions evolve in an iterative, asynchronous process, in which agents are activated one after another at random. When activated, an agent adopts the average of the opinions of its neighbors having a similar opinion (where similarity of opinions is defined using a parameter $$\varepsilon $$ ε ). Thus, the set of influencing neighbors of an agent may change over time. We show that such opinion dynamics are guaranteed to converge for any social network. We provide an upper bound of $${\text {O}}(n|E|^2 (\varepsilon /\delta )^2)$$ O(n|E|2(ε/δ)2) on the expected number of opinion updates until convergence to a stable state, where $$|E|$$ |E| is the number of edges of the social network, and $$\delta $$ δ is a parameter of the stability concept. For the complete social network we show a bound of $${\text {O}}(n^3(n^2 + (\varepsilon /\delta )^2))$$ O(n3(n2+(ε/δ)2)) that represents a major improvement over the previously best upper bound of $${\text {O}}(n^9 (\varepsilon /\delta )^2)$$ O(n9(ε/δ)2) .

Abstract. We consider a selection problem with stochastic probing. There is a set of items whose values are drawn from independent distributions. The distributions are known in advance. Each item can be tested repeatedly. Each test reduces the uncertainty about the realization of its value. We study a testing model, where the first test reveals whether the realized value is smaller or larger than the [Formula: see text]-quantile of the underlying distribution of some constant [Formula: see text]. Subsequent tests allow us to further narrow down the interval in which the realization is located. There is a limited number of possible tests, and our goal is to design near-optimal testing strategies that allow us to maximize the expected value of the chosen item. We study both identical and nonidentical distributions and develop polynomial-time algorithms with constant approximation factors in both scenarios.

The dynamics of real-world applications and systems require efficient methods for improving infeasible solutions or restoring corrupted ones by making modifications to the current state of a system in a restricted way. We propose a new framework of solution discovery via reconfiguration for constructing a feasible solution for a given problem by executing a sequence of small modifications starting from a given state. Our framework integrates different aspects of classical local search, reoptimization, and combinatorial reconfiguration. We exemplify our framework on a multitude of fundamental combinatorial problems, namely VERTEX COVER, INDEPENDENT SET, DOMINATING SET, and COLORING. We study the classical as well as the parameterized complexity of the solution discovery variants of those problems and explore the boundary between tractable and intractable instances.

In this paper, we introduce an over-time variant of the well-known prophet inequality with i.i.d. random variables. Instead of stopping with one realized value at some point in the process, we decide for each step how long we select the value. Then we cannot select another value until this period is over. The goal is to maximize the expectation of the sum of selected values. We describe the structure of the optimal stopping rule and give upper and lower bounds on the prophet inequality. In online algorithms terminology, this corresponds to bounds on the competitive ratio of an online algorithm.

In their seminal work on systemic risk in financial markets, Eisenberg and Noe [Larry Eisenberg and Thomas Noe, 2001] proposed and studied a model with n firms embedded into a network of debt relations. We analyze this model from a game-theoretic point of view. Every firm is a rational agent in a directed graph that has an incentive to allocate payments in order to clear as much of its debt as possible. Each edge is weighted and describes a liability between the firms. We consider several variants of the game that differ in the permissible payment strategies. We study the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria, and we provide bounds on the (strong) prices of anarchy and stability for a natural notion of social welfare. Our results highlight the power of financial regulation - if payments of insolvent firms can be centrally assigned, a socially optimal strong equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In contrast, worst-case strong equilibria can be a factor of Ω(n) away from optimal, and, in general, computing a best response is an NP-hard problem. For less permissible sets of strategies, we show that pure equilibria might not exist, and deciding their existence as well as computing them if they exist constitute NP-hard problems.

We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

We study general resource allocation problems with a diseconomy of scale. Given a finite set of commodities that request certain resources, the cost of each resource grows superlinearly with the demand for it, and our goal is to minimize the total cost of the resources. In large systems with limited coordination, it is natural to consider local dynamics where in each step a single commodity switches its allocated resources whenever the new solution after the switch has smaller total cost over all commodities. This yields a deterministic and polynomial time algorithm with approximation factor arbitrarily close to the locality gap, i.e., the worst case ratio of the cost of a local optimal and a global optimal solution. For costs that are polynomials with non-negative coefficients and maximal degree d, we provide a locality gap for weighted problems that is tight for all values of d. For unweighted problems, the locality gap asymptotically matches the approximation guarantee of the currently best known centralized algorithm [Makarychev, Srividenko FOCS14] but only requires local knowledge of the commodities.

In competitive packet routing games, packets are routed selfishly through a network and scheduling policies at edges determine which packages are forwarded first if there is not enough capacity on an edge to forward all packages at once. We analyze the impact of priority lists on the worst-case quality of pure Nash equilibria. A priority list is an ordered list of players that may or may not depend on the edge. Whenever the number of packets entering an edge exceeds the inflow capacity, packets are processed in list order. We derive several new bounds on the price of anarchy and stability for global and local priority policies. We also consider the question of the complexity of computing an optimal priority list. It turns out that even for very restricted cases, i.e., for routing on a tree, the computation of an optimal priority list is APX-hard.