EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Qionghua Zhu
dblp:156/4065
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network optimization and economics · 80% Wireless networking · 20% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Wireless networking › cognitive radio › spectrum access
dynamic spectrum access |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Revenue Sharing Based Resource Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2014 |
Network optimization and economics › game theory
game-theoretic networking |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Revenue Sharing Based Resource Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2014 |
Network optimization and economics › game theory › cooperative game theory
nash bargaining |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Revenue Sharing Based Resource Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2014 |
Network optimization and economics
resource allocation |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Revenue Sharing Based Resource Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2014 |
Network optimization and economics › game theory › dynamic game
stackelberg game |
0.2 | 1 | 2014 | Revenue Sharing Based Resource Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks · IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2014 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
polyblock approximation · 0.2brent's method · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | Revenue Sharing Based Resource Allocation for Dynamic Spectrum Access NetworksabstractWe propose a revenue sharing based resource allocation scheme for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks. In our scheme, based on a mutually agreed revenue sharing scheme, a primary network operator (PNO) actively shares its radio resource with a secondary network operator (SNO), which provides access service to secondary users (SUs) for its revenue maximization. To investigate the coupling effect between the revenue sharing and resource allocation, we formulate the interaction between PNO and SNO as a two-layered game, which includes a top layer game to model their revenue sharing and a bottom layer game to model their joint resource allocations. Specifically, in the top layer, based on their joint resource allocation decisions, the PNO and SNO form a Nash bargaining game to determine the revenue sharing scheme such that both of them can benefit from cooperation satisfactorily. Then, in the bottom layer, under the given revenue sharing scheme, the PNO and SNO form a Stackelberg game to determine their joint resource allocation decisions, which also influence their respective revenues. The two games work iteratively such that the PNO and SNO reach a final equilibrium state at which neither PNO nor SNO will change its decisions unilaterally in both layers. We propose efficient algorithms to solve both the top layer and bottom layer games and compute the final equilibrium of the two-layered game. Specifically, despite the non-convexity of joint resource allocation optimization problem in the bottom layer, we identify its hidden monotonic structure and propose an efficient algorithm, which is based on the polyblock approximation, to achieve the optimal solutions. Moreover, in the top layer, to tackle with the difficulty due to the lack of an analytical objective function for the revenue sharing problem, we explore its hidden unimodal property and propose a Brent's method based algorithm to achieve the optimal solution. Numerical results are presented to verify the performance of our algorithms and show that our revenue sharing based resource allocation scheme yields a win-win situation for the PNO and SNO. Yuan Wu 0001, Qionghua Zhu, Jianwei Huang 0001, Danny H. K. Tsang |
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. | 2 |