Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

R. Y. Kaln

dblp:156/4102 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1985
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 67% Hardware security and side channels · 33%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program verification · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
multilevel security
0.011985
Secure Ada Target: Issues, System Design, and Verification · S&P 1985
Systems and software security
secure system design
0.011985
Secure Ada Target: Issues, System Design, and Verification · S&P 1985
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
0.011985
Secure Ada Target: Issues, System Design, and Verification · S&P 1985
Program verification
security property verification
0.011985
Secure Ada Target: Issues, System Design, and Verification · S&P 1985

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

tagged objects · 0.0formal verification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1985 Secure Ada Target: Issues, System Design, and Verification
abstract
The Secure Ada Target (SAT) machine is designed to meet or exceed the DoD requirements for multi-level secure systems. This paper describes the require-ments on such designs, our approach to meeting these requirements by introducing tagged objects, and a specialized tagged object processor (TOP) that handles all operations involving tagged objects. Basic system security is achieved using a small software kernel and the TOP. The structure of our proofs, such that the system satisfies appropriate security properties, will be outlined. Brief remarks concerning the implementation of user Ada programs on the SAT system conclude the paper. Our design approach is largely independent of CPU selection, though implementation details necessarily depend on the processor selection.
William Earl Boebert, R. Y. Kaln, William D. Young, S. A. Hansohn
S&P2