In product advertising applications, the automated inpainting of backgrounds utilizing AI techniques in product images has emerged as a significant task. However, the techniques still suffer from issues such as inappropriate background and inconsistent product in generated product images, and existing approaches for evaluating the quality of generated product images are mostly inconsistent with human feedback causing the evaluation for this task to depend on manual annotation. To relieve the issues above, this paper proposes Human Feedback and Product Consistency (HFPC), which can automatically assess the generated product images based on two modules. Firstly, to solve inappropriate backgrounds, human feedback on 44,000 automated inpainting product images is collected to train a reward model based on multi-modal features extracted from BLIP and comparative learning. Secondly, to filter generated product images containing inconsistent products, a fine-tuned segmentation model is employed to segment the product of the original and generated product images and then compare the differences between the above two. Extensive experiments have demonstrated that HFPC can effectively evaluate the quality of generated product images and significantly reduce the expense of manual annotation. Moreover, HFPC achieves state-of-the-art (96.4% in precision) in comparison to other open-source visual-quality-assessment models.

For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficiency (PE). Our mechanisms also provide guarantees of ex-ante and ex-post fairness. The generalized eager Boston mechanism is ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post envy-free up to one item (EF1). The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness. We also show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies ex-post PE, EF1, and FCM simultaneously. In doing so, we expand the frontiers of simultaneously providing efficiency and both ex-ante and ex-post fairness guarantees for the assignment problem.

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents their top items, is often identified as an important efficiency criterion and measure of agents' satisfaction. In this paper, we propose a natural and intuitive efficiency property, favoring-eagerness-for-remaining-items (FERI), which requires that each item is allocated to an agent who ranks it highest among remaining items, thereby implying first-choice maximality. Using FERI as a heuristic, we design mechanisms that satisfy ex-post or ex-ante variants of FERI together with combinations of other desirable properties of efficiency (Pareto-efficiency), fairness (strong equal treatment of equals and sd-weak-envy-freeness), and strategyproofness (sd-weak-strategyproofness). We also explore the limits of FERI mechanisms in providing stronger efficiency, fairness, or strategyproofness guarantees through impossibility results.

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

We consider a distributed detection system for a wireless sensor network over slow-fading channels. Each sensor only has knowledge of quantized channel state information (CSI) which is received from the fusion center via a limited feedback channel. We then consider transmit power allocation at each sensor in order to maximize a J-divergence based detection metric subject to a total and individual transmit power constraints. Our aim is to jointly design the quantization regions of all sensors CSI and the corresponding power allocations. A locally optimum solution is obtained by applying the generalized Lloyd algorithm (GLA). To overcome the high computational complexity of the GLA, we then propose a low-complexity near-optimal scheme which performs very close to its GLA based counterpart. This enables us to explicitly formulate the problem and to find the unique solution despite the non-convexity of the optimization problem. An asymptotic analysis is also provided when the number of feedback bits becomes large. Numerical results illustrate that only a small amount of feedback is needed to achieve a detection performance close to the full CSI case.