Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Máté Horváth
dblp:156/9112
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-9512-5196ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 77% Hardware security and side channels · 16% Web and mobile security · 7% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key management |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key exchange › authenticated key exchange
password-authenticated key exchange |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Hardware security and side channels › cryptographic hardware
hardware security module |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM Protection · CCS 2024 |
Web and mobile security
messaging application security |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol · CRYPTO (4) 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
OPAQUE protocol · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Password-Protected Key Retrieval with(out) HSM ProtectionabstractPassword-protected key retrieval (PPKR) enables users to store and retrieve high-entropy keys from a server securely. The process is bootstrapped from a human-memorizable password only, addressing the challenge of how end-users can manage cryptographic key material. The core security requirement is protection against a corrupt server, which should not be able to learn the key or offline- attack it through the password protection. PPKR is deployed at a large scale with the WhatsApp Backup Protocol (WBP), allowing users to access their encrypted messaging history when switching to a new device. Davies et al. (Crypto'23) formally analyzed the WBP, proving that it satisfies most of the desired security. The WBP uses the OPAQUE protocol for password-based key exchange as a building block and relies on the server using a hardware security module (HSM) for most of its protection. In fact, the security analysis assumes that the HSM is incorruptible - rendering most of the heavy cryptography in the WBP obsolete. Sebastian H. Faller, Tobias Handirk, Julia Hesse, Máté Horváth, Anja Lehmann |
CCS | 4 |
| 2023 | Security Analysis of the WhatsApp End-to-End Encrypted Backup Protocol
Gareth T. Davies, Sebastian H. Faller, Kai Gellert, Tobias Handirk, Julia Hesse, Máté Horváth, Tibor Jager |
CRYPTO (4) | 6 |
| 2015 | Attribute-Based Encryption Optimized for Cloud Computing
Máté Horváth |
SOFSEM | 1 |