Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Douglas J. Brown

dblp:16/2312 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2006
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network measurement and analytics · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › attack strategy
denial-of-service attack
0.112006
Inferring Internet denial-of-service activity · ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 2006
Network security › attack modeling
attack characterization
0.012006
Inferring Internet denial-of-service activity · ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 2006

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trace analysis · 0.1backscatter analysis · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2006 Inferring Internet denial-of-service activity
abstract
In this article, we seek to address a simple question: “How prevalent are denial-of-service attacks in the Internet?” Our motivation is to quantitatively understand the nature of the current threat as well as to enable longer-term analyses of trends and recurring patterns of attacks. We present a new technique, called “backscatter analysis,” that provides a conservative estimate of worldwide denial-of-service activity. We use this approach on 22 traces (each covering a week or more) gathered over three years from 2001 through 2004. Across this corpus we quantitatively assess the number, duration, and focus of attacks, and qualitatively characterize their behavior. In total, we observed over 68,000 attacks directed at over 34,000 distinct victim IP addresses---ranging from well-known e-commerce companies such as Amazon and Hotmail to small foreign ISPs and dial-up connections. We believe our technique is the first to provide quantitative estimates of Internet-wide denial-of-service activity and that this article describes the most comprehensive public measurements of such activity to date.
David Moore 0001, Colleen Shannon, Douglas J. Brown, Geoffrey M. Voelker, Stefan Savage
ACM Trans. Comput. Syst.3