The arrival of quantum computers is imminent, with no room for uncertainty. It is only a matter of a few years before classical encryption algorithms face significant risks. NIST is leading the world to devise and standardize Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. In this study, we considered the Multivariate Polynomial Public Key (MPPK) Digital Signature (DS) algorithm as one of recent PQC algorithms and generated MPPK/DS key pairs with the true random number from the quantum computer. For each key pair, we calculated the semi-covariance correlation to measure its robustness against brute force attacks. The results show that, in average with the selected seed prime, MPPK has lower semi-covariance and thereby stronger robustness over traditional RSA and SPHINCS algorithms. Additionally, we measured the latency performance of MPPK/DS algorithm over 5G, WiFi, and local area networks, in comparison of RSA and SPHINCS algorithms. Finally, We made all developments available online for research community to carry out similar comparisons with other PQC algorithms.

As networking has become major innovation driver for the Internet of Things as well as Networks on Chips, the need for effective cryptography in hardware is on a steep rise. Both cost and overall system security are the main challenges in many application scenarios, rather than high throughput. In this work we present area-optimized implementations of the lightweight block cipher SIMON. All presented cores are protected against side channel attacks using threshold implementation, which applies secret sharing of different orders to prevent exploitable leakages. Implementation results show that, on FPGAs, the higher-order protected SIMON core can be smaller than an unprotected AES core at the same security level against classic cryptanalysis. Also, the proposed secure cores consume less than 30 percent the power of any unprotected AES. Security of the proposed cores is validated by provable arguments as well as practical t-test based leakage detection methods. In fact, we show that the first-order protected SIMON core does not have first-order leakage and is secure up to 10 million observations against higher-order attacks. The second-order secure implementation could not be exploited at all with up to 100 million observations.

Chaos-shift-keying (CSK) and differential CSK (DCSK) are the two popular coherent and non-coherent modulation schemes for ultra wide-band (UWB) communications. However, security of these schemes has never been studied formally from the information-theoretic perspective. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security of CSK and DCSK modulation schemes over AWGN and Rayleigh fading channels from the information-theoretic manner. For this aim, the average secrecy capacity and outage probability are computed and analyzed by considering the variation of bit energy Eb coming from the use of chaotic signal to convey information. Our results show that CSK has better or close secrecy capacity and outage probability compared with DCSK and the conventional spread-spectrum modulation. Additionally, these metrics favor Rayleigh fading channels over AWGN channels. Finally, we conclude that the non-constant bit energy is useful to enhance the physical layer security.