Myria Bouhaddi

dblp:160/7669 · DBLP profile ↗
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8ranked-venue papers
7as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0002-9941-550XORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 8 · 7 first-author · 6 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Hierarchical Temporal Evidence Fusion for Intrusion Detection in Edge-Fog-Cloud IoT Architectures
Myria Bouhaddi, Farah Yasmine Sadok
SECRYPT (1)1
2025 Strategic Detection of APTs Through Federated Spatio-Temporal Graph Learning and Stackelberg Defense
Myria Bouhaddi, Kamel Adi
CRiSIS1
2025 Robust Peer-to-Peer Machine Learning Against Poisoning Attacks
Myria Bouhaddi, Kamel Adi
SECRYPT1
2025 Optimal Noise Injection on Training Data: A Defense Against Membership Inference Attacks
Radia Kassa, Kamel Adi, Myria Bouhaddi
SECRYPT3
2024 Enhancing Privacy in Machine Learning: A Robust Approach for Preventing Attribute Inference Attacks
Myria Bouhaddi, Kamel Adi
SECRYPT1
2023 Multi-Environment Training Against Reward Poisoning Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning
Myria Bouhaddi, Kamel Adi
SECRYPT1
2018 An efficient intrusion detection in resource-constrained mobile ad-hoc networks
Myria Bouhaddi, Mohammed Said Radjef, Kamel Adi
Comput. Secur.1
2016 Evolutionary Game-Based Defense Mechanism in the MANETs
abstract
Providing a long term security of a computer system requires an efficient management of the resources consumption. This is particularly true for the Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) where nodes are characterized by limited resources. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework to predict malicious behaviors within a MANET and to analyze the best security alternatives that preserve the resources consumption of network entities. We model the interactions between an attacker and a defender evolving in the same environment as an evolutionary game. In these games, each entity can learn about the behavior of its opponent over time allowing the adjustment of its strategy. The main results of our game model are the elaboration of the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESSs) which is a stronger concept of equilibria and the illustration of the evolution process, based on the replicator dynamic. Numerical experiments verify the correctness of our theoretical analysis and show the feasibility and effectiveness of our model.
Myria Bouhaddi, Kamel Adi, Mohammed Said Radjef
SIN1