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Ioannis Gasparis

dblp:161/2424 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-authorComputer networks · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Authentication and access control · 50% Web and mobile security · 44% Malware analysis · 6%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.722019
Figment: Fine-grained Permission Management for Mobile Apps · INFOCOM 2019
Detecting Android Root Exploits by Learning from Root Providers · USENIX Security Symposium 2017
Authentication and access control
access control
0.412019
Figment: Fine-grained Permission Management for Mobile Apps · INFOCOM 2019
Authentication and access control › access control
permission management
0.412019
Figment: Fine-grained Permission Management for Mobile Apps · INFOCOM 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

aspect-oriented programming · 0.4machine learning · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Figment: Fine-grained Permission Management for Mobile Apps
abstract
Today's Android systems do not allow users to manage the permissions granted to applications (apps) in a flexible and dynamic way. Recent studies show that apps often misuse these permissions to access private information, or have trapdoors via which other malicious apps can do the same. In this paper, we develop a framework Figment, which consists of set of libraries that developers can easily use to build in fine-grained dynamic permission management capabilities. The users of their apps can readily invoke these capabilities during execution. The apps would potentially run with reduced functionalities if the user does not wish to allow certain permissions. Figment also allows either the developer or a user to specify context aware permissions, which cause different permissions to be granted to the app in different functional modes (contexts). We believe that Figment reduces the attack surface exposed to potentially malicious apps and offers a significant step in preserving user privacy. While the rudimentary version of Figment uses aspect-oriented programming and does not need rooting of the phone or changes to the Android sub-system, we also provide an optional root-level fail safe implementation that facilitates the embedding of dynamic permission management functions in old applications not built by using Figment libraries. We show that Figment offers significant benefits over the Android Marshmallow permission management system with lower runtime overheads; the main penalty is a one time higher compilation overhead.
Ioannis Gasparis, Zhiyun Qian, Chengyu Song, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, Rajiv Gupta 0001, Paul L. Yu
INFOCOM1
2018 Droid M+: Developer Support for Imbibing Android's New Permission Model
abstract
In Android 6.0, Google revamped its long criticized permission model to prompt the user during runtime, and allow her to dynamically revoke granted permissions. Towards steering developers to this new model and improve user experience, Google also provides guidelines on (a) how permission requests should be formulated (b) how to educate users on why a permission is needed and (c) how to provide feedback when a permission is denied. In this paper we perform, to the best of our knowledge, the first measurement study on the adoption of Android's new model on recently updated apps from the official Google Play Store. We find that, unfortunately, (1) most apps have not been migrated to this new model and (2) for those that do support the model, many do not adhere to Google's guidelines. We attribute this unsatisfying status quo to the lack of automated transformation tools that can help developers refactor their code; via an IRB approved study we find that developers felt that there was a non-trivial effort involved in migrating their apps to the new model. Towards solving this problem, we develop Droid M+, a system that helps developers to easily retrofit their legacy code to support the new permission model and adhere to Google's guidelines. We believe that Droid M+ offers a significant step in preserving user privacy and improving user experience.
Ioannis Gasparis, Azeem Aqil, Zhiyun Qian, Chengyu Song, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, Rajiv Gupta 0001, Edward Colbert
AsiaCCS1
2017 Detecting Android Root Exploits by Learning from Root Providers
Ioannis Gasparis, Zhiyun Qian, Chengyu Song, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy
USENIX Security Symposium1