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Wayne Wang

dblp:162/6923 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0008-7553-5612ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Network security · 54% Privacy and data protection · 46%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network measurement and analytics · 77% Internet architecture and protocols · 23%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
privacy auditing
1.012026
MVPNalyzer: An Investigative Framework for Auditing the Security & Privacy of Mobile VPNs · NDSS 2026
Network security
traffic analysis
0.912025
Fingerprinting Deep Packet Inspection Devices by their Ambiguities · CCS 2025
Network security › secure communication › network-layer security
virtual private networks
0.312026
MVPNalyzer: An Investigative Framework for Auditing the Security & Privacy of Mobile VPNs · NDSS 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

fingerprinting · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 MVPNalyzer: An Investigative Framework for Auditing the Security & Privacy of Mobile VPNs
Wayne Wang, Aaron Ortwein, Enrique Sobrados, Robert Stanley, Piyush Kumar Sharma, Afsah Anwar, Roya Ensafi
NDSS1
2025 Fingerprinting Deep Packet Inspection Devices by their Ambiguities
abstract
Users around the world face escalating network interference such as censorship, throttling, and interception, largely driven by the commoditization and growing availability of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) devices. Once reserved for a few well-resourced nation-state actors, the ability to interfere with traffic at scale is now within reach of nearly any network operator. Despite this proliferation, our understanding of DPIs and their deployments on the Internet remains limited---being network intermediary leaves DPI unresponsive to conventional host-based scanning tools, and DPI vendors actively obscuring their products further complicates measurement efforts.
Diwen Xue, Armin Huremagic, Wayne Wang, Ram Sundara Raman, Roya Ensafi
CCS3