Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Dimitriy V. Masterov

dblp:162/9061 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
2 papers
Computational finance and economics · 50% Computational social science and digital humanities · 50%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Information extraction and text analysis · 100%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper
Recommender systems · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Natural language and speech › Information extraction and text analysis
sentiment analysis
0.212015
Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages · EC 2015
Computational finance and economics › platform economics
online marketplace analysis
0.212015
Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages · EC 2015
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.212015
Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets? · WWW 2015
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory
online auction
0.212015
Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets? · WWW 2015
Recommender systems › user modeling
user behavior prediction
0.112015
Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages · EC 2015

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

text classification · 0.7logistic regression · 0.7instrumental variables estimation · 0.4causal inference · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages
abstract
Reputation and feedback systems in online marketplaces are often biased, making it difficult to ascertain the quality of sellers. We use post-transaction, buyer-to-seller message traffic to detect signals of unsatisfactory transactions on eBay. We posit that a message sent after the item was paid for serves as a reliable indicator that the buyer may be unhappy with that purchase, particularly when the message included words associated with a negative experience. The fraction of a seller's message traffic that was negative predicts whether a buyer who transacts with this seller will stop purchasing on eBay, implying that platforms can use these messages as an additional signal of seller quality.
Dimitriy V. Masterov, Uwe F. Mayer, Steven Tadelis
EC1
2015 Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets?
abstract
A common complaint about online auctions for consumer goods is the presence of ``snipers,'' who place bids in the final seconds of sequential ascending auctions with predetermined ending times. The literature conjectures that snipers are best-responding to the existence of ``incremental" bidders that bid up to their valuation only as they are outbid. Snipers aim to catch these incremental bidders at a price below their reserve, with no time to respond. As a consequence, these incremental bidders may experience regret when they are outbid at the last moment at a price below their reservation value. We measure the effect of this experience on a new buyer's propensity to participate in future auctions. We show the effect to be causal using a carefully selected subset of auctions from eBay.com and instrumental variables estimation strategy. Bidders respond to sniping quite strongly and are between 4 and 18 percent less likely to return to the platform.
Matt Backus, Thomas Blake, Dimitriy V. Masterov, Steven Tadelis
WWW3