Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Nav Jagpal
dblp:165/5508
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
3 papers |
Malware analysis · 57% Web and mobile security · 34% Network security · 9% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network measurement and analytics · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Malware analysis
pay-per-install |
0.2 | 1 | 2016 | Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software · USENIX Security Symposium 2016 |
Network security
malware propagation |
0.1 | 1 | 2016 | Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software · USENIX Security Symposium 2016 |
Web and mobile security
browser security |
0.1 | 1 | 2015 | Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions · USENIX Security Symposium 2015 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
revenue chain analysis · 0.4measurement pipeline · 0.4measurement study · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software
Kurt Thomas, Juan A. Elices Crespo, Ryan Rasti, Jean-Michel Picod, Cait Phillips, Marc-André Decoste, Chris Sharp, Fabio Tirelo, Ali Tofigh, Marc-Antoine Courteau, Lucas Ballard, Robert Shield, Nav Jagpal, Moheeb Abu Rajab, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Niels Provos, Elie Bursztein, Damon McCoy |
USENIX Security Symposium | 13 |
| 2015 | Ad Injection at Scale: Assessing Deceptive Advertisement ModificationsabstractToday, web injection manifests in many forms, but fundamentally occurs when malicious and unwanted actors tamper directly with browser sessions for their own profit. In this work we illuminate the scope and negative impact of one of these forms, ad injection, in which users have ads imposed on them in addition to, or different from, those that websites originally sent them. We develop a multi-staged pipeline that identifies ad injection in the wild and captures its distribution and revenue chains. We find that ad injection has entrenched itself as a cross-browser monetization platform impacting more than 5% of unique daily IP addresses accessing Google -- tens of millions of users around the globe. Injected ads arrive on a client's machine through multiple vectors: our measurements identify 50,870 Chrome extensions and 34,407 Windows binaries, 38% and 17% of which are explicitly malicious. A small number of software developers support the vast majority of these injectors who in turn syndicate from the larger ad ecosystem. We have contacted the Chrome Web Store and the advertisers targeted by ad injectors to alert each of the deceptive practices involved. Kurt Thomas, Elie Bursztein, Chris Grier, Grant Ho, Nav Jagpal, Alexandros Kapravelos, Damon McCoy, Antonio Nappa, Vern Paxson, Paul Pearce, Niels Provos, Moheeb Abu Rajab |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 5 |
| 2015 | Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions
Nav Jagpal, Eric Dingle, Jean-Philippe Gravel, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Niels Provos, Moheeb Abu Rajab, Kurt Thomas |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |