This paper introduces Perséphone, a kernel-bypass OS scheduler designed to minimize tail latency for applications executing at microsecond-scale and exhibiting wide service time distributions. Perséphone integrates a new scheduling policy, Dynamic Application-aware Reserved Cores (DARC), that reserves cores for requests with short processing times. Unlike existing kernel-bypass schedulers, DARC is not work conserving. DARC profiles application requests and leaves a small number of cores idle when no short requests are in the queue, so when short requests do arrive, they are not blocked by longer-running ones. Counter-intuitively, leaving cores idle lets DARC maintain lower tail latencies at higher utilization, reducing the overall number of cores needed to serve the same workloads and consequently better utilizing the datacenter resources.

There are a wealth of good-quality open-source tools for teaching, learning about, and experimenting with P4-based SDN. But this tooling and its mode of distribution is geared towards usage at the level of "nuts and bolts", requiring effort to setup even for casual or inexperienced users, and does not give "big picture" insight into the network as the system executes. Our poster describes FDP, a portable platform that builds on existing tooling to enable end-to-end experimentation and zero-effort in-browser interactive visualization, which we envision can benefit teaching of P4-based SDN and research demonstration.

We revisit the gap between what distributed systems need from the transport layer and what protocols in wide deployment provide. Such a gap complicates the implementation of distributed systems and impacts their performance. We introduce Tunable Multicast Communication (TMC), an abstraction that allows developers to easily specialize communication channels in distributed systems. TMC is presented as a deployable and extensible user-space library that exposes high-level tunable guarantees. TMC has the potential of improving the performance of distributed applications with minimal-to-zero development and deployment effort.

This paper presents DeDoS, a novel platform for mitigating asymmetric DoS attacks. These attacks are particularly challenging since even attackers with limited resources can exhaust the resources of well-provisioned servers. DeDoS offers a framework to deploy code in a highly modular fashion. If part of the application stack is experiencing a DoS attack, DeDoS can massively replicate only the affected component, potentially across many machines. This allows scaling of the impacted resource separately from the rest of the application stack, so that resources can be precisely added where needed to combat the attack. Our evaluation results show that DeDoS incurs reasonable overheads in normal operations, and that it significantly outperforms standard replication techniques when defending against a range of asymmetric attacks.