EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
George Tsamis
dblp:165/9062
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · unresolved
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Interconnection networks and networks-on-chip · 50% Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 50% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Interconnection networks and networks-on-chip
network interface |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Security in MPSoCs: A NoC Firewall and an Evaluation Framework · IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 2015 |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture
security enforcement |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Security in MPSoCs: A NoC Firewall and an Evaluation Framework · IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. 2015 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
rule-based filtering · 0.2gem5 simulation · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Security in MPSoCs: A NoC Firewall and an Evaluation FrameworkabstractIn multiprocessor system-on-chip (MPSoC), a CPU can access physical resources, such as on-chip memory or I/O devices. Along with normal requests, malevolent ones, generated by malicious processes running in one or more CPUs, could occur. A protection mechanism is therefore required to prevent injection of malicious instructions or data across the system. We propose a self-contained Network-on-Chip (NoC) firewall at the network interface (NI) layer which, by checking the physical address against a set of rules, rejects untrusted CPU requests to the on-chip memory, thus protecting all legitimate processes running in a multicore SoC. To sustain high performance, we implement the firewall in hardware, with rule-checking performed at segment-level based on deny rules. Furthermore, to evaluate its impact, we develop a novel framework on top of gem5 simulation environment, coupling ARM technology and an instance of a commercial point-to-point interconnect from STMicroelectronics (STNoC). Simulation tests include scenarios in which legitimate and malicious processes, running in different CPUs, request access to shared memory. Our results indicate that a firewall implementation at the NI can have a positive effect on network performance by reducing both end-to-end network delay and power consumption. We also show that our coarse-grain firewall can prevent saturation of the on-chip network and performs better than fine-grain alternatives that perform rule checking at page-level. Simulation results are accompanied with field measurements performed on a Zedboard platform running Linux, whereas the NoC Firewall is implemented as a reconfigurable, memory-mapped device on top of AMBA AXI4 interconnect fabric. Miltos D. Grammatikakis, Kyprianos Papademetriou, Polydoros Petrakis, Antonis Papagrigoriou, Ioannis Christoforakis, Othon Tomoutzoglou, George Tsamis, Marcello Coppola |
IEEE Trans. Comput. Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst. | 8 |