Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Daniele Enrico Asoni

dblp:166/1414 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
5ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0001-5699-9237ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet architecture and protocols · 77% Routing and switching · 23%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Internet architecture and protocols › network architecture design › layered architecture › protocol layering
network layer
0.212015
HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer · CCS 2015
Network security
anonymity networks
0.212015
HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer · CCS 2015
Network security › anonymity networks
onion routing
0.212015
HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer · CCS 2015
Routing and switching › packet forwarding
high-speed packet forwarding
0.112015
HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer · CCS 2015

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

symmetric cryptography · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Low-Rate Overuse Flow Tracer (LOFT): An Efficient and Scalable Algorithm for Detecting Overuse Flows
abstract
Current probabilistic flow-size monitoring can only detect heavy hitters (e.g., flows utilizing 10 times their permitted bandwidth), but cannot detect smaller overuse (e.g., flows utilizing 50-100 % more than their permitted bandwidth). Thus, these systems lack accuracy in the challenging environment of high-throughput packet processing, where fast-memory resources are scarce. Nevertheless, many applications rely on accurate flow-size estimation, e.g., for network monitoring, anomaly detection and Quality of Service. We design, analyze, implement, and evaluate LOFT, a new approach for efficiently detecting overuse flows that achieves dramatically better properties than prior work. LOFT can detect 1.50x overuse flows in one second, whereas prior approaches can only reliably detect flows that overuse their allocation by at least 3x. We demonstrate LOFT's suitability for high-speed packet processing with implementations in the DPDK framework and on an FPGA.
Simon Scherrer, Che-Yu Wu, Yu-Hsi Chiang, Benjamin Rothenberger, Daniele Enrico Asoni, Arish Sateesan, Jo Vliegen, Nele Mentens, Hsu-Chun Hsiao, Adrian Perrig
SRDS5
2018 CLEF: Limiting the Damage Caused by Large Flows in the Internet Core
Hao Wu 0018, Hsu-Chun Hsiao, Daniele Enrico Asoni, Simon Scherrer, Adrian Perrig, Yih-Chun Hu
CANS3
2018 TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the Network Layer
abstract
Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter whether constructed as an overlay or implemented at the network layer, offer limited security guarantees against traffic analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems offer strong security guarantees at the cost of computational overhead and long delays, which are excessive for interactive applications. We propose TARANET, an anonymity system that implements protection against traffic analysis at the network layer, and limits the incurred latency and overhead. In TARANET's setup phase, traffic analysis is thwarted by mixing. In the data transmission phase, end hosts and ASes coordinate to shape traffic into constant-rate transmission using packet splitting. Our prototype implementation shows that TARANET can forward anonymous traffic at over 50 Gbps using commodity hardware.
Chen Chen 0013, Daniele Enrico Asoni, Adrian Perrig, David Barrera 0003, George Danezis, Carmela Troncoso
EuroS&P2
2017 A Paged Domain Name System for Query Privacy
Daniele Enrico Asoni, Samuel Hitz, Adrian Perrig
CANS1
2015 HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer
abstract
We present HORNET, a system that enables high-speed end-to-end anonymous channels by leveraging next-generation network architectures. HORNET is designed as a low-latency onion routing system that operates at the network layer thus enabling a wide range of applications. Our system uses only symmetric cryptography for data forwarding yet requires no per-flow state on intermediate routers. This design enables HORNET routers implemented on off-the-shelf hardware to process anonymous traffic at over 93 Gb/s. HORNET is also highly scalable, adding minimal processing overhead per additional anonymous channel.
Chen Chen 0013, Daniele Enrico Asoni, David Barrera 0003, George Danezis, Adrian Perrig
CCS2