Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ulrich Scherhag
dblp:166/6747
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
4as first author
2since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0002-6280-048XORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 3 · 2 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 2 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Biometric security · 100% | |
| Computer graphics and multimedia
1 paper |
Image and video processing · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Biometric security
face recognition |
0.9 | 2 | 2021 | Morphing Attack Detection-Database, Evaluation Platform, and Benchmarking · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2021 Deep Face Representations for Differential Morphing Attack Detection · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020 |
Biometric security › face recognition
morphing attack detection |
0.9 | 2 | 2021 | Morphing Attack Detection-Database, Evaluation Platform, and Benchmarking · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2021 Deep Face Representations for Differential Morphing Attack Detection · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020 |
Biometric security
biometric recognition |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Morphing Attack Detection-Database, Evaluation Platform, and Benchmarking · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2021 |
Biometric security › face recognition
morphing attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Deep Face Representations for Differential Morphing Attack Detection · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020 |
Image and video processing
image post-processing |
0.1 | 1 | 2020 | Deep Face Representations for Differential Morphing Attack Detection · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
deep face representation · 0.9evaluation platform · 0.5benchmarking · 0.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Morphing Attack Detection: A Fusion Approach
Siri Lorenz, Ulrich Scherhag, Christian Rathgeb, Christoph Busch 0001 |
FUSION | 2 |
| 2021 | Morphing Attack Detection-Database, Evaluation Platform, and BenchmarkingabstractMorphing attacks have posed a severe threat to Face Recognition System (FRS). Despite the number of advancements reported in recent works, we note serious open issues such as independent benchmarking, generalizability challenges and considerations to age, gender, ethnicity that are inadequately addressed. Morphing Attack Detection (MAD) algorithms often are prone to generalization challenges as they are database dependent. The existing databases, mostly of semi-public nature, lack in diversity in terms of ethnicity, various morphing process and post-processing pipelines. Further, they do not reflect a realistic operational scenario for Automated Border Control (ABC) and do not provide a basis to test MAD on unseen data, in order to benchmark the robustness of algorithms. In this work, we present a new sequestered dataset for facilitating the advancements of MAD where the algorithms can be tested on unseen data in an effort to better generalize. The newly constructed dataset consists of facial images from 150 subjects from various ethnicities, age-groups and both genders. In order to challenge the existing MAD algorithms, the morphed images are with careful subject pre-selection created from the contributing images, and further post-processed to remove morphing artifacts. The images are also printed and scanned to remove all digital cues and to simulate a realistic challenge for MAD algorithms. Further, we present a new online evaluation platform to test algorithms on sequestered data. With the platform we can benchmark the morph detection performance and study the generalization ability. This work also presents a detailed analysis on various subsets of sequestered data and outlines open challenges for future directions in MAD research. Kiran B. Raja, Matteo Ferrara, Annalisa Franco, Luuk J. Spreeuwers, Ilias Batskos, Florens de Wit, Marta Gomez-Barrero, Ulrich Scherhag, Sushma Venkatesh, Jag Mohan Singh, Guoqiang Li 0007, Loïc Bergeron, Sergey Isadskiy, Ramachandra Raghavendra, Christian Rathgeb, Dinusha Frings, Uwe Seidel, Fons Knopjes, Raymond N. J. Veldhuis, Davide Maltoni, Christoph Busch 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 8 |
| 2020 | Finding the Suitable Doppelgänger for a Face Morphing AttackabstractID cards are uniquely linked to one individual via a printed or electronically provided facial image. Even though the face is treated as universal and distinctive characteristic, twins can weaken this distinctiveness because of their biological similarity. Also, humans might falsely recognise an unknown person as a friend - colloquially named a Dop-pelgänger. Recently it was demonstrated that this biological effect of similar data subjects can be purposefully established between two individuals in order to improve the vulnerability of the so-called morphing attack. This image manipulation technique creates a melted facial image which is similar to two or more data subjects. If embedded into an ID card, the manipulated reference image can be used by all participating individuals and thus the concept of a unique link is broken. This work elaborates the rather neglected part of selecting morph pairs based on a similarity score instead of a simple random assignment. It discusses the applicability of different possible algorithms. The finally developed approach considers complex real-world constraints while being executable in a reasonable amount of time and producing acceptable large morph sets. It is shown that this algorithm greatly increases the vulnerability of automated face recognition systems. Surprisingly, it also proves that an effective pre-selection of pairs questions the need of in-depth optimized morphing algorithms. Alexander Röttcher, Ulrich Scherhag, Christoph Busch 0001 |
IJCB | 2 |
| 2020 | Deep Face Representations for Differential Morphing Attack DetectionabstractThe vulnerability of facial recognition systems to face morphing attacks is well known. Many different approaches for morphing attack detection (MAD) have been proposed in the scientific literature. However, the MAD algorithms proposed so far have mostly been trained and tested on datasets whose distributions of image characteristics are either very limited (e.g., only created with a single morphing tool) or rather unrealistic (e.g., no print-scan transformation). As a consequence, these methods easily overfit on certain image types and the results presented cannot be expected to apply to real-world scenarios. For example, the results of the latest NIST FRVT MORPH show that the majority of submitted MAD algorithms lacks robustness and performance when considering unseen and challenging datasets. In this work, subsets of the FERET and FRGCv2 face databases are used to create a realistic database for training and testing of MAD algorithms, containing a large number of ICAO-compliant bona fide facial images, corresponding unconstrained probe images, and morphed images created with four different face morphing tools. Furthermore, multiple post-processings are applied on the reference images, e.g., print-scan and JPEG2000 compression. On this database, previously proposed differential morphing algorithms are evaluated and compared. In addition, the application of deep face representations for differential MAD algorithms is investigated. It is shown that algorithms based on deep face representations can achieve very high detection performance (less than 3% D-EER) and robustness with respect to various post-processings. Finally, the limitations of the developed methods are analyzed. Ulrich Scherhag, Christian Rathgeb, Johannes Merkle, Christoph Busch 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 1 |
| 2018 | Towards Detection of Morphed Face Images in Electronic Travel DocumentsabstractThe vulnerability of face recognition systems to attacks based on morphed biometric samples has been established in the recent past. Such attacks pose a severe security threat to a biometric recognition system in particular within the widely deployed border control applications. However, so far a reliable detection of morphed images has remained an unsolved research challenge. In this work, automated morph detection algorithms based on general purpose pattern recognition algorithms are benchmarked for two scenarios relevant in the context of fraud detection for electronic travel documents, i.e. single image (no-reference) and image pair (differential) morph detection. In the latter scenario a trusted live capture from an authentication attempt serves as additional source of information and, hence, the difference between features obtained from this face image and a potential morph can be estimated. A dataset of 2,206 ICAO compliant bona fide face images of the FRGCv2 face database is used to automatically generate 4,808 morphs. It is shown that in a differential scenario morph detectors which utilize a score level-based fusion of detection scores obtained from a single image and differences between image pairs generally outperform no-reference morph detectors with regard to the employed algorithms and used parameters. On average a relative improvement of more than 25% in terms of detection equal error rate is achieved. Ulrich Scherhag, Christian Rathgeb, Christoph Busch 0001 |
DAS | 1 |
| 2018 | Detecting Morphed Face Images Using Facial Landmarks
Ulrich Scherhag, Dhanesh Budhrani, Marta Gomez-Barrero, Christoph Busch 0001 |
ICISP | 1 |
| 2016 | Unit-Selection Attack Detection Based on Unfiltered Frequency-Domain Features
Ulrich Scherhag, Andreas Nautsch, Christian Rathgeb, Christoph Busch 0001 |
INTERSPEECH | 1 |