Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Vittorio P. Illiano
dblp:167/8102 · also Vittorio Paolo Illiano
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0002-1750-8826ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 2 · 2 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Cyber-physical and IoT security · 44% Usable security · 44% Network security · 13% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Internet of things and sensor networks › wireless sensor network
event detection |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Don't fool Me!: Detection, Characterisation and Diagnosis of Spoofed and Masked Events in Wireless Sensor Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2017 |
Internet of things and sensor networks
wireless sensor network |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Don't fool Me!: Detection, Characterisation and Diagnosis of Spoofed and Masked Events in Wireless Sensor Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2017 |
Usable security › security operations › security analytics › malicious activity detection
collusion detection |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Don't fool Me!: Detection, Characterisation and Diagnosis of Spoofed and Masked Events in Wireless Sensor Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2017 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
wireless sensor network security |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Don't fool Me!: Detection, Characterisation and Diagnosis of Spoofed and Masked Events in Wireless Sensor Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2017 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | Don't fool Me!: Detection, Characterisation and Diagnosis of Spoofed and Masked Events in Wireless Sensor Networks · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
wavelet transform · 0.6anomaly detection · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Determining Resilience Gains From Anomaly Detection for Event Integrity in Wireless Sensor NetworksabstractMeasurements collected in a wireless sensor network (WSN) can be maliciously compromised through several attacks, but anomaly detection algorithms may provide resilience by detecting inconsistencies in the data. Anomaly detection can identify severe threats to WSN applications, provided that there is a sufficient amount of genuine information. This article presents a novel method to calculate an assurance measure for the network by estimating the maximum number of malicious measurements that can be tolerated. In previous work, the resilience of anomaly detection to malicious measurements has been tested only against arbitrary attacks, which are not necessarily sophisticated. The novel method presented here is based on an optimization algorithm, which maximizes the attack’s chance of staying undetected while causing damage to the application, thus seeking the worst-case scenario for the anomaly detection algorithm. The algorithm is tested on a wildfire monitoring WSN to estimate the benefits of anomaly detection on the system’s resilience. The algorithm also returns the measurements that the attacker needs to synthesize, which are studied to highlight the weak spots of anomaly detection. Finally, this article presents a novel methodology that takes in input the degree of resilience required and automatically designs the deployment that satisfies such a requirement. Vittorio P. Illiano, Andrea Paudice, Luis Muñoz-González, Emil C. Lupu |
ACM Trans. Sens. Networks | 1 |
| 2017 | Unity is strength!: combining attestation and measurements inspection to handle malicious data injections in WSNsabstractAttestation and measurements inspection are different but complementary approaches towards the same goal: ascertaining the integrity of sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks. In this paper we compare the benefits and drawbacks of both techniques and seek to determine how to best combine them. However, our study shows that no single solution exists, as each choice introduces changes in the measurements collection process, affects the attestation protocol, and gives a different balance between the high detection rate of attestation and the low power overhead of measurements inspection. Therefore, we propose three strategies that combine measurements inspection and attestation in different ways, and a way to choose between them based on the requirements of different applications. We analyse their performance both analytically and in a simulator. The results show that the combined strategies can achieve a detection rate close to attestation, in the range 96--99%, whilst keeping a power overhead close to measurements inspection, in the range 1--10%. Vittorio P. Illiano, Rodrigo Vieira Steiner, Emil C. Lupu |
WISEC | 1 |
| 2017 | Don't fool Me!: Detection, Characterisation and Diagnosis of Spoofed and Masked Events in Wireless Sensor NetworksabstractWireless Sensor Networks carry a high risk of being compromised, as their deployments are often unattended, physically accessible and the wireless medium is difficult to secure. Malicious data injections take place when the sensed measurements are maliciously altered to trigger wrong and potentially dangerous responses. When many sensors are compromised, they can collude with each other to alter the measurements making such changes difficult to detect. Distinguishing between genuine and malicious measurements is even more difficult when significant variations may be introduced because of events, especially if more events occur simultaneously. We propose a novel methodology based on wavelet transform to detect malicious data injections, to characterise the responsible sensors, and to distinguish malicious interference from faulty behaviours. The results, both with simulated and real measurements, show that our approach is able to counteract sophisticated attacks, achieving a significant improvement over state-of-the-art approaches. Vittorio P. Illiano, Luis Muñoz-González, Emil C. Lupu |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 1 |
| 2015 | Detecting Malicious Data Injections in Event Detection Wireless Sensor NetworksabstractWireless sensor networks (WSNs) are vulnerable and can be maliciously compromised, either physically or remotely, with potentially devastating effects. When sensor networks are used to detect the occurrence of events such as fires, intruders, or heart attacks, malicious data can be injected to create fake events, and thus trigger an undesired response, or to mask the occurrence of actual events. We propose a novel algorithm to identify malicious data injections and build measurement estimates that are resistant to several compromised sensors even when they collude in the attack. We also propose a methodology to apply this algorithm in different application contexts and evaluate its results on three different datasets drawn from distinct WSN deployments. This leads us to identify different tradeoffs in the design of such algorithms and how they are influenced by the application context. Vittorio P. Illiano, Emil C. Lupu |
IEEE Trans. Netw. Serv. Manag. | 1 |