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Robert Shield

dblp:17/4521 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2017
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Malware analysis · 77% Network security · 23%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Malware analysis
pay-per-install
0.212016
Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software · USENIX Security Symposium 2016
Network security
malware propagation
0.112016
Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software · USENIX Security Symposium 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

measurement study · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2017 Detecting Patching of Executables without System Calls
abstract
Popular software applications (e.g. web browsers) are targeted by malicious organizations which develop potentially unwanted programs (PUPs). If such a PUP executes on benign user devices, it is able to manipulate the process memory of popular applications, their locally stored resources or their environment in a profitable way for the attacker and in detriment to benign end-users. We describe the implementation of a tamper detection mechanism based on code self-checksumming, able to detect static and dynamic patching of executables, performed by PUPs or other attackers. As opposed to other works based on code self-checksumming, our approach can also checksum instructions which contain absolute addresses affected by relocation, without using calls to external libraries. We implemented this solution for the x86 ISA and evaluated the performance impact and effectiveness. The results indicate that the run-time overhead of self-checksumming grows proportionally with the level of protection, which can be specified as input to our implementation. We have applied our implementation on the Chromium web-browser and observed that the overhead is practically unobservable for the end-user.
Sebastian Banescu, Mohsen Ahmadvand, Alexander Pretschner, Robert Shield, Chris Hamilton
CODASPY4
2016 Investigating Commercial Pay-Per-Install and the Distribution of Unwanted Software
Kurt Thomas, Juan A. Elices Crespo, Ryan Rasti, Jean-Michel Picod, Cait Phillips, Marc-André Decoste, Chris Sharp, Fabio Tirelo, Ali Tofigh, Marc-Antoine Courteau, Lucas Ballard, Robert Shield, Nav Jagpal, Moheeb Abu Rajab, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Niels Provos, Elie Bursztein, Damon McCoy
USENIX Security Symposium12
2015 Software-Based Protection against Changeware
abstract
We call changeware software that surreptitiously modifies resources of software applications, e.g., configuration files. Changeware is developed by malicious entities which gain profit if their changeware is executed by large numbers of end-users of the targeted software. Browser hijacking malware is one popular example that aims at changing web-browser settings such as the default search engine or the home page. Changeware tends to provoke end-user dissatisfaction with the target application, e.g. due to repeated failure of persisting the desired configuration. We describe a solution to counter changeware, to be employed by vendors of software targeted by changeware. It combines several protection mechanisms: white-box cryptography to hide a cryptographic key, software diversity to counter automated key retrieval attacks, and run-time process memory integrity checking to avoid illegitimate calls of the developed API.
Sebastian Banescu, Alexander Pretschner, Dominic Battré, Stéfano Cazzulani, Robert Shield, Greg Thompson
CODASPY5