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Scotty Bauer

dblp:170/5338 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › protection mechanism › isolation
kernel isolation
0.412019
LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems · USENIX ATC 2019
Systems and software security
operating system security
0.112019
LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems · USENIX ATC 2019

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

isolation · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems
Vikram Narayanan, Abhiram Balasubramanian, Charlie Jacobsen, Sarah Spall, Scotty Bauer, Michael Quigley, Aftab Hussain 0001, Abdullah Younis, Junjie Shen 0001, Moinak Bhattacharyya, Anton Burtsev
USENIX ATC5
2015 Lightweight capability domains: towards decomposing the Linux kernel
abstract
Despite a number of radical changes in how computer systems are used, the design principles behind the very core of the systems stack---an operating system kernel---has remained unchanged for decades. We run monolithic kernels developed with a combination of an unsafe programming language, global sharing of data structures, opaque interfaces, and no explicit knowledge of kernel protocols. Today, the monolithic architecture of a kernel is the main factor undermining its security, and even worse, limiting its evolution towards a safer, more secure environment. Lack of isolation across kernel subsystems allows attackers to take control over the entire machine with a single kernel vulnerability. Furthermore, complex, semantically rich monolithic code with globally shared data structures and no explicit interfaces is not amenable to formal analysis and verification tools. Even after decades of work to make monolithic kernels more secure, over a hundred serious kernel vulnerabilities are still reported every year.
Charles Jacobsen, Muktesh Khole, Sarah Spall, Scotty Bauer, Anton Burtsev
PLOS@SOSP4