Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Scotty Bauer
dblp:170/5338
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › protection mechanism › isolation
kernel isolation |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems · USENIX ATC 2019 |
Systems and software security
operating system security |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems · USENIX ATC 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
isolation · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | LXDs: Towards Isolation of Kernel Subsystems
Vikram Narayanan, Abhiram Balasubramanian, Charlie Jacobsen, Sarah Spall, Scotty Bauer, Michael Quigley, Aftab Hussain 0001, Abdullah Younis, Junjie Shen 0001, Moinak Bhattacharyya, Anton Burtsev |
USENIX ATC | 5 |
| 2015 | Lightweight capability domains: towards decomposing the Linux kernelabstractDespite a number of radical changes in how computer systems are used, the design principles behind the very core of the systems stack---an operating system kernel---has remained unchanged for decades. We run monolithic kernels developed with a combination of an unsafe programming language, global sharing of data structures, opaque interfaces, and no explicit knowledge of kernel protocols. Today, the monolithic architecture of a kernel is the main factor undermining its security, and even worse, limiting its evolution towards a safer, more secure environment. Lack of isolation across kernel subsystems allows attackers to take control over the entire machine with a single kernel vulnerability. Furthermore, complex, semantically rich monolithic code with globally shared data structures and no explicit interfaces is not amenable to formal analysis and verification tools. Even after decades of work to make monolithic kernels more secure, over a hundred serious kernel vulnerabilities are still reported every year. Charles Jacobsen, Muktesh Khole, Sarah Spall, Scotty Bauer, Anton Burtsev |
PLOS@SOSP | 4 |