We study a class of two-player zero-sum Colonel Blotto games in which, after allocating soldiers across battlefields, players engage in (possibly distinct) normal-form games on each battlefield. Per-battlefield payoffs are parameterized by the soldier allocations. This generalizes the classical Blotto setting, where outcomes depend only on relative soldier allocations. We consider both discrete and continuous allocation models and examine two types of aggregate objectives: linear aggregation and worst-case battlefield value. For each setting, we analyze the existence and computability of Nash equilibrium. The general problem is not convex-concave, which limits the applicability of standard convex optimization techniques. However, we show that in several settings it is possible to reformulate the strategy space in a way where convex-concave structure is recovered. We evaluate the proposed methods on synthetic and real-world instances inspired by security applications, suggesting that our approaches scale well in practice.

Real-world security applications (e.g., cybersecurity) often involve multiple attack paths, each with layers of defenses that an attacker needs to sequentially overcome before a successful attack on the entire system. Each defensive resource changes dynamically in efficacy as the attack unfolds. In this paper, we study the case where attackers are adaptive, potentially switching paths over time in response to these changes with the goal to minimize the expected time until a successful attack. We formalize this as a min-max game and give examples where adaptive attackers are more powerful than non-adaptive ones. We show that defenses that do not account for adaptivity can perform arbitrarily worse. A connection between the attacker's optimal strategy with the classical theory of multi-armed bandits and the Gittins index is made, yielding a simple gradient based algorithm to solve our proposed min-max game. Experiments on synthetic settings validate our approach.

While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study k-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to mixed strategies with support size at most k. Finding k-sparse commitments is known to be computationally hard. We start by showing several structural properties of k-sparse solutions, including that the optimal support may vary dramatically as k increases. These results suggest that naive greedy or double-oracle-based approaches are unlikely to yield practical algorithms. We then develop a simple approach based on mixed integer linear programs (MILPs) for zero-sum games, general-sum Stackelberg games, and various forms of structured sparsity. We also propose practical algorithms for cases where one or both players have large (i.e., practically innumerable) action sets, utilizing a combination of MILPs and incremental strategy generation. We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-world scenarios based on security applications. In both settings, we observe that even for small support sizes, we can obtain more than 90% of the true Nash value while maintaining a reasonable runtime, demonstrating the significance of our formulation and algorithms.

Censoring is the central problem in survival analysis where either the time-to-event (for instance, death), or the time-to censoring (such as loss of follow-up) is observed for each sample. The majority of existing machine learning-based survival analysis methods assume that survival is conditionally independent of censoring given a set of covariates; an assumption that cannot be verified since only marginal distributions is available from the data. The existence of dependent censoring, along with the inherent bias in current estimators has been demonstrated in a variety of applications, accentuating the need for a more nuanced approach. However, existing methods that adjust for dependent censoring require practitioners to specify the ground truth copula. This requirement poses a significant challenge for practical applications, as model misspecification can lead to substantial bias. In this work, we propose a flexible deep learning-based survival analysis method that simultaneously accommodate for dependent censoring and eliminates the requirement for specifying the ground truth copula. We theoretically prove the identifiability of our model under a broad family of copulas and survival distributions. Experiments results from a wide range of datasets demonstrate that our approach successfully discerns the underlying dependency structure and significantly reduces survival estimation bias when compared to existing methods.

Coalitions naturally exist in many real-world systems involving multiple decision makers such as ridesharing, security, and online ad auctions, but the coalition structure among the agents is often unknown. We propose and study an important yet previously overseen problem -- Coalition Structure Learning (CSL), where we aim to carefully design a series of games for the agents and infer the underlying coalition structure by observing their interactions in those games. We establish a lower bound on the sample complexity -- defined as the number of games needed to learn the structure -- of any algorithms for CSL and propose the Iterative Grouping (IG) algorithm for designing normal-form games to achieve the lower bound. We show that IG can be extended to other succinct games such as congestion games and graphical games. Moreover, we solve CSL in a more restrictive and practical setting: auctions. We show a variant of IG to solve CSL in the auction setting even if we cannot design the bidder valuations. Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate IG in the auction setting and the results align with our theoretical analysis.

In many machine learning systems that jointly learn from multiple modalities, a core research question is to understand the nature of multimodal interactions: how modalities combine to provide new task-relevant information that was not present in either alone. We study this challenge of interaction quantification in a semi-supervised setting with only labeled unimodal data and naturally co-occurring multimodal data (e.g., unlabeled images and captions, video and corresponding audio) but when labeling them is time-consuming. Using a precise information-theoretic definition of interactions, our key contribution is the derivation of lower and upper bounds to quantify the amount of multimodal interactions in this semi-supervised setting. We propose two lower bounds: one based on the shared information between modalities and the other based on disagreement between separately trained unimodal classifiers, and derive an upper bound through connections to approximate algorithms for min-entropy couplings. We validate these estimated bounds and show how they accurately track true interactions. Finally, we show how these theoretical results can be used to estimate multimodal model performance, guide data collection, and select appropriate multimodal models for various tasks.

We study the problem of online unweighted bipartite matching with $n$ offline vertices and $n$ online vertices where one wishes to be competitive against the optimal offline algorithm. While the classic RANKING algorithm of (Karp et al., 1990) provably attains competitive ratio of $1-1/e > 1/2$, we show that no learning-augmented method can be both 1-consistent and strictly better than 1/2-robust under the adversarial arrival model. Meanwhile, under the random arrival model, we show how one can utilize methods from distribution testing to design an algorithm that takes in external advice about the online vertices and provably achieves competitive ratio interpolating between any ratio attainable by advice-free methods and the optimal ratio of 1, depending on the advice quality.

Function approximation (FA) has been a critical component in solving large zero-sum games. Yet, little attention has been given towards FA in solving general-sum extensive-form games, despite them being widely regarded as being computationally more challenging than their fully competitive or cooperative counterparts. A key challenge is that for many equilibria in general-sum games, no simple analogue to the state value function used in Markov Decision Processes and zero-sum games exists. In this paper, we propose learning the Enforceable Payoff Frontier (EPF)---a generalization of the state value function for general-sum games. We approximate the optimal Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium by representing EPFs with neural networks and training them by using appropriate backup operations and loss functions. This is the first method that applies FA to the Stackelberg setting, allowing us to scale to much larger games while still enjoying performance guarantees based on FA error. Additionally, our proposed method guarantees incentive compatibility and is easy to evaluate without having to depend on self-play or approximate best-response oracles.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem—thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

The recent explosion of interest in multimodal applications has resulted in a wide selection of datasets and methods for representing and integrating information from different modalities. Despite these empirical advances, there remain fundamental research questions: How can we quantify the interactions that are necessary to solve a multimodal task? Subsequently, what are the most suitable multimodal models to capture these interactions? To answer these questions, we propose an information-theoretic approach to quantify the degree of redundancy, uniqueness, and synergy relating input modalities with an output task. We term these three measures as the PID statistics of a multimodal distribution (or PID for short), and introduce two new estimators for these PID statistics that scale to high-dimensional distributions. To validate PID estimation, we conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic datasets where the PID is known and on large-scale multimodal benchmarks where PID estimations are compared with human annotations. Finally, we demonstrate their usefulness in (1) quantifying interactions within multimodal datasets, (2) quantifying interactions captured by multimodal models, (3) principled approaches for model selection, and (4) three real-world case studies engaging with domain experts in pathology, mood prediction, and robotic perception where our framework helps to recommend strong multimodal models for each application.

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and wildlife poaching prevention. Even though many of these settings are sequential in nature, existing techniques pre-compute the entire solution ahead of time. In this paper, we present a theoretically sound and empirically effective way to apply search, which leverages extra online computation to improve a solution, to the computation of Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games. Instead of the leader attempting to solve the full game upfront, an approximate "blueprint" solution is first computed offline and is then improved online for the particular subgames encountered in actual play. We prove that our search technique is guaranteed to perform no worse than the pre-computed blueprint strategy, and empirically demonstrate that it enables approximately solving significantly larger games compared to purely offline methods. We also show that our search operation may be cast as a smaller Stackelberg problem, making our method complementary to existing algorithms based on strategy generation.

This paper presents a multi-staged approach to nonmyopic adaptive Gaussian process optimization (GPO) for Bayesian optimization (BO) of unknown, highly complex objective functions that, in contrast to existing nonmyopic adaptive BO algorithms, exploits the notion of macro-actions for scaling up to a further lookahead to match up to a larger available budget. To achieve this, we generalize GP upper confidence bound to a new acquisition function defined w.r.t. a nonmyopic adaptive macro-action policy, which is intractable to be optimized exactly due to an uncountable set of candidate outputs. The contribution of our work here is thus to derive a nonmyopic adaptive epsilon-Bayes-optimal macro-action GPO (epsilon-Macro-GPO) policy. To perform nonmyopic adaptive BO in real time, we then propose an asymptotically optimal anytime variant of our epsilon-Macro-GPO policy with a performance guarantee. We empirically evaluate the performance of our epsilon-Macro-GPO policy and its anytime variant in BO with synthetic and real-world datasets.

A central problem in machine learning and statistics is to model joint densities of random variables from data. Copulas are joint cumulative distribution functions with uniform marginal distributions and are used to capture interdependencies in isolation from marginals. Copulas are widely used within statistics, but have not gained traction in the context of modern deep learning. In this paper, we introduce ACNet, a novel differentiable neural network architecture that enforces structural properties and enables one to learn an important class of copulas--Archimedean Copulas. Unlike Generative Adversarial Networks, Variational Autoencoders, or Normalizing Flow methods, which learn either densities or the generative process directly, ACNet learns a generator of the copula, which implicitly defines the cumulative distribution function of a joint distribution. We give a probabilistic interpretation of the network parameters of ACNet and use this to derive a simple but efficient sampling algorithm for the learned copula. Our experiments show that ACNet is able to both approximate common Archimedean Copulas and generate new copulas which may provide better fits to data.

With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a powerful differentiable end-to-end learning frameworks which embed a game solver within a deep-learning framework, allowing unknown game parameters to be learned via backpropagation, this framework faces significant limitations when applied to boundedly rational human agents and large scale problems, leading to poor practicality. In this paper, we address these limitations and propose a framework that is applicable for more practical settings. First, seeking to learn the rationality of human agents in complex two-player zero-sum games, we draw upon well-known ideas in decision theory to obtain a concise and interpretable agent behavior model, and derive solvers and gradients for end-to-end learning. Second, to scale up to large, real-world scenarios, we propose an efficient first-order primal-dual method which exploits the structure of extensive-form games, yielding significantly faster computation for both game solving and gradient computation. When tested on randomly generated games, we report speedups of orders of magnitude over previous approaches. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our model on both real-world one-player settings and synthetic data.

Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players' sequential strategy spaces to construct a regret minimizer that recursively minimizes regret at each decision point in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce the first efficient regret minimization algorithm for computing extensive-form correlated equilibria in large two-player general-sum games with no chance moves. Designing such an algorithm is significantly more challenging than designing one for the Nash equilibrium counterpart, as the constraints that define the space of correlation plans lack the hierarchical structure and might even form cycles. We show that some of the constraints are redundant and can be excluded from consideration, and present an efficient algorithm that generates the space of extensive-form correlation plans incrementally from the remaining constraints. This structural decomposition is achieved via a special convexity-preserving operation that we coin scaled extension. We show that a regret minimizer can be designed for a scaled extension of any two convex sets, and that from the decomposition we then obtain a global regret minimizer. Our algorithm produces feasible iterates. Experiments show that it significantly outperforms prior approaches and for larger problems it is the only viable option.

While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting, the strategic behavior of players is complemented by an external device that privately recommends moves to agents as the game progresses; players are free to deviate at any time, but will then not receive future recommendations. Our contributions are threefold. First, we show that an EFCE can be formulated as the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem. To showcase how this novel formulation can inspire new algorithms to compute EFCEs, we propose a simple subgradient descent method which exploits this formulation and structural properties of EFCEs. Our method has better scalability than the prior approach based on linear programming. Second, we propose two benchmark games, which we hope will serve as the basis for future evaluation of EFCE solvers. These games were chosen so as to cover two natural application domains for EFCE: conflict resolution via a mediator, and bargaining and negotiation. Third, we document the qualitative behavior of EFCE in our proposed games. We show that the social-welfare-maximizing equilibria in these games are highly nontrivial and exhibit surprisingly subtle sequential behavior that so far has not received attention in the literature.

Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the relatively under-explored but equally important "inverse" setting, where the parameters of the underlying game are not known to all agents, but must be learned through observations. We propose a differentiable, end-to-end learning framework for addressing this task. In particular, we consider a regularized version of the game, equivalent to a particular form of quantal response equilibrium, and develop 1) a primal-dual Newton method for finding such equilibrium points in both normal and extensive form games; and 2) a backpropagation method that lets us analytically compute gradients of all relevant game parameters through the solution itself. This ultimately lets us learn the game by training in an end-to-end fashion, effectively by integrating a "differentiable game solver" into the loop of larger deep network architectures. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the learning method in several settings including poker and security game tasks.

This paper presents a novel nonmyopic adaptive Gaussian process planning (GPP) framework endowed with a general class of Lipschitz continuous reward functions that can unify some active learning/sensing and Bayesian optimization criteria and offer practitioners some flexibility to specify their desired choices for defining new tasks/problems. In particular, it utilizes a principled Bayesian sequential decision problem framework for jointly and naturally optimizing the exploration-exploitation trade-off. In general, the resulting induced GPP policy cannot be derived exactly due to an uncountable set of candidate observations. A key contribution of our work here thus lies in exploiting the Lipschitz continuity of the reward functions to solve for a nonmyopic adaptive epsilon-optimal GPP (epsilon-GPP) policy. To plan in real time, we further propose an asymptotically optimal, branch-and-bound anytime variant of epsilon-GPP with performance guarantee. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our epsilon-GPP policy and its anytime variant in Bayesian optimization and an energy harvesting task.