EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Vaibhav Neema
dblp:172/8930
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0000-0003-0922-373XORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 3 · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | A Hardware Attack Secure SRAM: A HAS-16T SRAM Cell Resistant to Side Channel Attacks and Fault-Injection AttacksabstractThis article presents the HAS-16T static random access memory (SRAM) cell, a novel 16-transistor design implemented in 45 nm CMOS technology to achieve robust security against side-channel attacks (SCAs) and fault injection attacks (FIAs). The cell integrates sleep transistors, loop-cut mechanisms, prewrite conditioning, and an inverter feedback loop to mitigate leakage power analysis (LPA), timing analysis attacks (TAAs), and FIAs. A comprehensive security measure, based on Monte Carlo simulations (1000 samples, 1 V,$27~^{\circ } $C), quantifies resistance through histogram overlap and failure probability, yielding a total security matrix (SMTotal) of 98.68%, the highest among evaluated cells (e.g., 6T: 38.37%, EQ-14T: 68.91%). Simulations in the Cadence design environment reveal the HAS-16T’s second-highest static noise margin (SNM), moderate read/write delays, second-lowest write dynamic power, and second-highest leakage power, reflecting a balanced tradeoff for security-critical applications. Compared to conventional and secure SRAM designs, the HAS-16T offers unparalleled protection, making it ideal for cryptographic and embedded systems. Future work includes area optimization and scalability to advanced process nodes. Nitesh Kumar soni, Vaibhav Neema, Shailesh Singh Chouhan, Rakesh Singhai |
IEEE Trans. Very Large Scale Integr. Syst. | 3 |
| 2026 | Corrections to "A Hardware Attack Secure SRAM: A HAS-16T SRAM Cell Resistant to Side Channel Attacks and Fault-Injection Attacks"abstractThis addresses the error in [1]. Table I Column 1 wrong citation: 8T [14]ST-12T [15]LC-7T [16]QUCC-12T [17]RHBD-14T [18]SEUH-12T [19]RH-12T [20]RH-14T [21]EQ-14T [22]. Nitesh Kumar soni, Vaibhav Neema, Shailesh Singh Chouhan, Rakesh Singhai |
IEEE Trans. Very Large Scale Integr. Syst. | 3 |
| 2025 | Secure & Reliable 10T SRAM Cell during Read, Write and Hold Operations against Power Analysis AttackabstractCryptography is essential to ensure data security in embedded devices that handle sensitive data. SRAM boosts overall performance by temporarily storing cryptographic keys. However, attackers can use side-channel, such as Power Analysis, to exploit power consumption patterns and extract secret keys. Once a key is compromised, encrypted data becomes vulnerable. There are many secure SRAM cell designs available in the literature, but they often degrade other performance parameters. This article presents a novel 10-T SRAM cell design that provides protection against power analysis side-channel attacks (SCA) across all three cell operations, while also maintaining the performance of other key parameters. Monte Carlo simulations were conducted on 1,000 samples each for case when BL = Q and BL ≠ Q during reading, writing, and holding data, using Cadence Virtuoso with a 45-nm technology node at 1V/270°C. Based on these simulations, the mean power difference was evaluated. The proposed P-10T SRAM cell exhibits a 0% mean power difference in all three modes of operation, demonstrating complete resilience to power analysis SCA. The design achieves 84.87% reliability with hold stability, read stability, and write ability values of 429 mV, 242 mV, and 250 mV, respectively. Furthermore, the write power dissipation of P-10T cell is 57.44 μW, which is 1.80 × lower than the power consumed by the conventional 6T cell. Aastha Gupta, Ravi Sindal, Vaibhav Neema |
ACM Trans. Design Autom. Electr. Syst. | 3 |