EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Nikolay Matyunin
dblp:177/5286
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6ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0001-8974-3078ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Uncovering CWE-CVE-CPE Relations with Threat Knowledge GraphsabstractSecurity assessment relies on public information about products, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses. So far, databases in these categories have rarely been analyzed in combination. Yet, doing so could help predict unreported vulnerabilities and identify common threat patterns. In this article, we propose a methodology for producing and optimizing a knowledge graph that aggregates knowledge from common threat databases (CVE, CWE, and CPE). We apply the threat knowledge graph to predict associations between threat databases, specifically between products, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses. We evaluate the prediction performance both in closed world with associations from the knowledge graph and in open world with associations revealed afterward. Using rank-based metrics (i.e., Mean Rank, Mean Reciprocal Rank, and Hits@N scores), we demonstrate the ability of the threat knowledge graph to uncover many associations that are currently unknown but will be revealed in the future, which remains useful over different time periods. We propose approaches to optimize the knowledge graph and show that they indeed help in further uncovering associations. We have made the artifacts of our work publicly available. Zhenpeng Shi, Nikolay Matyunin, Kalman Graffi, David Starobinski |
ACM Trans. Priv. Secur. | 2 |
| 2022 | TargetFuzz: Using DARTs to Guide Directed Greybox FuzzersabstractSoftware development is a continuous and incremental process. Developers continuously improve their software in small batches rather than in one large batch. The high frequency of small batches makes it essential to use effective testing methods that detect bugs under limited testing time. To this end, researchers propose directed greybox fuzzing (DGF) which aims to generate test cases towards stressing certain target sites. Different from the coverage-based greybox fuzzing (CGF) which aims to maximize code coverage in the whole program, the goal of DGF is to cover potentially buggy code regions (e.g., a recently modified program region). While prior works improve several aspects of DGF (such as power scheduling, input prioritization, and target selection), little attention has been given to improving the seed selection process. Existing DGF tools use seed corpora mainly tailored for CGF (i.e., a set of seeds that cover different regions of the program). We observe that using CGF-based corpora limits the bug-finding capability of a directed greybox fuzzer. To mitigate this shortcoming, we propose TargetFuzz, a mechanism that provides a DGF tool with a target-oriented seed corpus. We refer to this corpus as DART corpus, which contains only 'close' seeds to the targets. This way, DART corpus guides DGF to the targets, thereby exposing bugs even under limited fuzzing time. Evaluations on 34 real bugs show that AFLGo (a state-of-the-art directed greybox fuzzer), when equipped with DART corpus, finds 10 additional bugs and achieves $4.03x speedup, on average, in the time-to-exposure compared to a generic CGF-based corpus. Sadullah Canakci, Nikolay Matyunin, Kalman Graffi, Ajay Joshi, Manuel Egele |
AsiaCCS | 2 |
| 2022 | Evaluation of Cache Attacks on Arm Processors and Secure CachesabstractTiming-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time, a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors are vulnerable to. Compared to x86, Arm uses different architectures, microarchitectural implementations, cache replacement policies, etc., which affects how attacks can be launched, and how security testing for the vulnerabilities should be done. To evaluate security, this paper presents security benchmarks specifically developed for testing Arm processors and their caches. The benchmarks are evaluated with sensitivity tests, which examine how sensitive the benchmarks are to having a correct configuration in the testing phase. Further, to evaluate a large number of devices, this work leverages a novel approach of using a cloud-based Arm device testbed for architectural and security research on timing channels and runs the benchmarks on 34 different physical devices. In parallel, there has been much interest in secure caches to defend the various attacks. Consequently, this paper also investigates secure cache architectures using proposed benchmarks. Especially, this paper implements and evaluates secure PL and RF caches, showing the security of PL and RF caches, but also uncovers new weaknesses. Shuwen Deng, Nikolay Matyunin, Wenjie Xiong 0001, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001, Jakub Szefer |
IEEE Trans. Computers | 2 |
| 2019 | Vibrational Covert Channels using Low-Frequency Acoustic SignalsabstractIn this paper, we examine how acoustic signals in sub-bass and infrasonic range can be used to establish a vibrational covert channel between speaker-equipped computers and mobile devices. We show that typical consumer speakers are capable of producing low-frequency sounds, which are not perceivable by humans. At the same time, we show that producing such sounds by the speaker's woofer inevitably generates slight vibrations of the speaker and the surface where it is located. Being unnoticeable to people, such vibrations can be captured by the accelerometer sensor of a mobile device located on the same surface. Therefore, information can be encoded into low-frequency sounds played by a speaker and received on a mobile device by analyzing the produced vibrations. Note that access to the accelerometer on modern mobile devices does not require any user permissions, making the transmission completely unnoticeable. We evaluate the presented covert channel for different speakers, apply it to several application scenarios, and give an overview of possible countermeasures. Nikolay Matyunin, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001 |
IH&MMSec | 1 |
| 2018 | Tracking Private Browsing Sessions using CPU-based Covert ChannelsabstractIn this paper we examine the use of covert channels based on CPU load in order to achieve persistent user identification through browser sessions. In particular, we demonstrate that an HTML5 video, a GIF image, or CSS animations on a webpage can be used to force the CPU to produce a sequence of distinct load levels, even without JavaScript or any client-side code. Nikolay Matyunin, Nikolaos A. Anagnostopoulos, Spyros Boukoros, Markus Heinrich, André Schaller, Maksim Kolinichenko, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001 |
WISEC | 1 |
| 2016 | Covert channels using mobile device's magnetic field sensorsabstractThis paper presents a new covert channel using smartphone magnetic sensors. We show that modern smartphones are capable to detect the magnetic field changes induced by different computer components during I/O operations. In particular, we are able to create a covert channel between a laptop and a mobile device without any additional equipment, firmware modifications or privileged access on either of the devices. We present two encoding schemes for the covert channel communication and evaluate their effectiveness. Nikolay Matyunin, Jakub Szefer, Sebastian Biedermann, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001 |
ASP-DAC | 1 |