Can online trackers and network adversaries de-anonymize web browsing data readily available to them? We show---theoretically, via simulation, and through experiments on real user data---that de-identified web browsing histories can be linked to social media profiles using only publicly available data. Our approach is based on a simple observation: each person has a distinctive social network, and thus the set of links appearing in one's feed is unique. Assuming users visit links in their feed with higher probability than a random user, browsing histories contain tell-tale marks of identity. We formalize this intuition by specifying a model of web browsing behavior and then deriving the maximum likelihood estimate of a user's social profile. We evaluate this strategy on simulated browsing histories, and show that given a history with 30 links originating from Twitter, we can deduce the corresponding Twitter profile more than 50% of the time.To gauge the real-world effectiveness of this approach, we recruited nearly 400 people to donate their web browsing histories, and we were able to correctly identify more than 70% of them. We further show that several online trackers are embedded on sufficiently many websites to carry out this attack with high accuracy. Our theoretical contribution applies to any type of transactional data and is robust to noisy observations, generalizing a wide range of previous de-anonymization attacks. Finally, since our attack attempts to find the correct Twitter profile out of over 300 million candidates, it is---to our knowledge---the largest-scale demonstrated de-anonymization to date.

Online social networks regularly offer users personalized, algorithmic suggestions of whom to connect to. Here we examine the aggregate effects of such recommendations on network structure, focusing on whether these recommendations increase the popularity of niche users or, conversely, those who are already popular. We investigate this issue by empirically and theoretically analyzing abrupt changes in Twitter's network structure around the mid-2010 introduction of its "Who to Follow" feature. We find that users across the popularity spectrum benefitted from the recommendations; however, the most popular users profited substantially more than average. We trace this "rich get richer" phenomenon to three intertwined factors. First, as is typical of network recommenders, the system relies on a "friend-of-friend"-style algorithm, which we show generally results in users being recommended proportional to their degree. Second, we find that the baseline growth rate of users is sublinear in degree. This mismatch between the recommender and the natural network dynamics thus alters the structural evolution of the network. Finally, we find that people are much more likely to respond positively to recommendations for popular users---perhaps because of their greater name recognition---further amplifying the cumulative advantage of well-known individuals.