Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Taras Stanko
dblp:178/5277
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 56% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 29% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 15% | |
| Theoretical computer science
2 papers |
Coding theory · 100% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels › hardware security primitives
physical unclonable function |
0.6 | 2 | 2018 | Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 Optimized Quantization in Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
fuzzy extractor |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
key storage |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 |
Hardware security and side channels › hardware security primitives › physical unclonable function
helper data algorithms |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Optimized Quantization in Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › key generation
key extraction |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Optimized Quantization in Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Optimized Quantization in Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017 |
Coding theory
binary asymmetric channel |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018 |
Coding theory › source coding
quantization |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | Optimized Quantization in Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
binary asymmetric channel model · 0.7zero leakage quantization · 0.6error correction · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Fingerprint template protection using minutia-pair spectral representationsabstractStorage of biometric data requires some form of template protection in order to preserve the privacy of people enrolled in a biometric database. One approach is to use a Helper Data System. Here it is necessary to transform the raw biometric measurement into a fixed-length representation. In this paper, we extend the spectral function approach of Stanko and Škorić (IEEE Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2017) which provides such a fixed-length representation for fingerprints. First, we introduce a new spectral function that captures different information from the minutia orientations. It is complementary to the original spectral function, and we use both of them to extract information from a fingerprint image. Second, we construct a helper data system consisting of zero-leakage quantisation followed by the Code Offset Method. We show empirical data on matching performance and entropy content. On the negative side, transforming a list of minutiae to the spectral representation degrades the matching performance significantly. On the positive side, adding privacy protection to the spectral representation can be done with little loss of performance. Taras Stanko, Bin Chen 0006, Boris Skoric |
EURASIP J. Inf. Secur. | 1 |
| 2018 | Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy ExtractorsabstractIn recent years, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a promising building block for key storage and device authentication. PUFs are physical systems, and as such, their responses are inherently noisy, precluding a straightforward derivation of cryptographic key material from raw PUF measurements. To overcome this drawback, fuzzy extractors are used to eliminate the noise and guarantee robust outputs. A special type is reverse fuzzy extractors, shifting the computational load of error correction toward a computationally powerful verifier. However, the reverse fuzzy extractor reveals error patterns to any eavesdropper, which may cause privacy issues (due to a systematic drift of the PUF responses, the error pattern is linkable to the identity) and even security problems (if the noise is data-dependent). In this paper, we quantify the issue of leakage due to asymmetry of noise, leveraging the binary asymmetric channel (BAC) model. We further propose to concatenate two BACs to form a symmetric channel, as a solution that is able to eliminate such noise. Finally, we propose a modified reverse fuzzy extractor that does not leak via the error patterns even in the case of systematic drift of the PUF responses. André Schaller, Taras Stanko, Boris Skoric, Stefan Katzenbeisser 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 2 |
| 2017 | Optimized Quantization in Zero Leakage Helper Data SystemsabstractHelper data systems are a cryptographic primitive that allows for the reproducible extraction of secrets from noisy measurements. Redundancy data called helper data makes it possible to do error correction while leaking little or nothing (Zero Leakage) about the extracted secret string. We study the case of non-discrete measurement outcomes. In this case, a quantization step is required. Recently, de Grootet al.described a generic method to perform the quantization in a Zero Leakage manner. We extend their work and show how the quantization intervals should be set to maximize the amount of extracted secret key material when noise is taken into account. Taras Stanko, Fitria Nur Andini, Boris Skoric |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 1 |