Koen Koning

dblp:183/1931 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0001-6614-4371ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 5 · 2 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Copy-on-Flip: Hardening ECC Memory Against Rowhammer Attacks
Andrea Di Dio, Koen Koning, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida
NDSS2
2022 DangZero: Efficient Use-After-Free Detection via Direct Page Table Access
abstract
Use-after-free vulnerabilities remain difficult to detect and mitigate, making them a popular source of exploitation. Existing solutions incur impractical performance/memory overhead, require specialized hardware, and/or guarantee only protection, but not detection.
Floris Gorter, Koen Koning, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida
CCS2
2019 kMVX: Detecting Kernel Information Leaks with Multi-variant Execution
abstract
Kernel information leak vulnerabilities are a major security threat to production systems. Attackers can exploit them to leak confidential information such as cryptographic keys or kernel pointers. Despite efforts by kernel developers and researchers, existing defenses for kernels such as Linux are limited in scope or incur a prohibitive performance overhead. In this paper, we present kMVX, a comprehensive defense against information leak vulnerabilities in the kernel by running multiple diversified kernel variants simultaneously on the same machine. By constructing these variants in a careful manner, we can ensure they only show divergences when an attacker tries to exploit bugs present in the kernel. By detecting these divergences we can prevent kernel information leaks. Our kMVX design is inspired by multi-variant execution (MVX). Traditional MVX designs cannot be applied to kernels because of their assumptions on the run-time environment. kMVX, on the other hand, can be applied even to commodity kernels. We show our Linux-based prototype provides powerful protection against information leaks at acceptable performance overhead (20--50% in the worst case for popular server applications).
Sebastian Österlund, Koen Koning, Pierre Olivier, Antonio Barbalace, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida
ASPLOS2
2018 Delta pointers: buffer overflow checks without the checks
abstract
Despite decades of research, buffer overflows still rank among the most dangerous vulnerabilities in unsafe languages such as C and C++. Compared to other memory corruption vulnerabilities, buffer overflows are both common and typically easy to exploit. Yet, they have proven so challenging to detect in real-world programs that existing solutions either yield very poor performance, or introduce incompatibilities with the C/C++ language standard.
Taddeus Kroes, Koen Koning, Erik van der Kouwe, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida
EuroSys2
2017 No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware
abstract
As modern 64-bit x86 processors no longer support the segmentation capabilities of their 32-bit predecessors, most research projects assume that strong in-process memory isolation is no longer an affordable option. Instead of strong, deterministic isolation, new defense systems therefore rely on the probabilistic pseudo-isolation provided by randomization to "hide" sensitive (or safe) regions. However, recent attacks have shown that such protection is insufficient; attackers can leak these safe regions in a variety of ways.
Koen Koning, Xi Chen 0038, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida, Elias Athanasopoulos
EuroSys1
2016 Secure and Efficient Multi-Variant Execution Using Hardware-Assisted Process Virtualization
abstract
Memory error exploits rank among the most serious security threats. Of the plethora of memory error containment solutions proposed over the years, most have proven to be too weak in practice. Multi-Variant eXecution (MVX) solutions can potentially detect arbitrary memory error exploits via divergent behavior observed in diversified program variants running in parallel. However, none have found practical applicability in security due to their non-trivial performance limitations. In this paper, we present MvArmor, an MVX system that uses hardware-assisted process virtualization to monitor variants for divergent behavior in an efficient yet secure way. To provide comprehensive protection against memory error exploits, MvArmor relies on a new MVX-aware variant generation strategy. The system supports user-configurable security policies to tune the performance-security trade-off. Our analysis shows that MvArmor can counter many classes of modern attacks at the cost of modest performance overhead, even with conservative detection policies.
Koen Koning, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida
DSN1
2016 AM3: Towards A Hardware Unix Accelerator for Many-Cores
abstract
This article advocates the use of new architectural features commonly found in many-cores to replace the machine model underlying Unix-like operating systems. We present a general Abstract Many-core Machine Model (AM$^3$), a proof-of-concept implementation and first evaluation results in the context of an emerging many-core, hardware multi-threaded architecture without support for interrupts. Our proposed approach makes it possible to reuse off-the-shelf multithreaded/multiprocess software on massively parallel architectures, without need to change code to use custom programming models like CUDA or OpenCL. Benefits include higher hardware utilization, higher performance and higher energy efficiency for workloads common to general-purpose platforms, such as in datacenters and clouds. The benefits also include simpler software control over the hardware platform, an enabling factor for the further evolution of parallel programming languages.
Raphael 'kena' Poss, Koen Koning
IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst.2