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Ioannis Stais

dblp:184/6097 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
0000-0002-8599-8409ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 46% Web and mobile security · 30% Security and privacy of machine learning · 15%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Automata and formal languages · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.522016
Back in Black: Towards Formal, Black Box Analysis of Sanitizers and Filters · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016
Web and mobile security
web application firewall
0.522016
Back in Black: Towards Formal, Black Box Analysis of Sanitizers and Filters · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery
differential testing
0.212016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
evasion attack
0.212016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016
Software testing › model learning
automata learning
0.212016
Back in Black: Towards Formal, Black Box Analysis of Sanitizers and Filters · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016
Automata and formal languages › grammatical inference
automata learning
0.212016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016
Digital forensics and information hiding
fingerprinting
0.112016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
intrusion detection
0.112016
SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning · CCS 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transducer inference · 0.5symbolic finite automata inference · 0.5model-based root cause analysis · 0.5membership/equivalence query model · 0.5mealy machine inference · 0.5black-box learning · 0.5automata learning · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2016 SFADiff: Automated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting Using Black-box Differential Automata Learning
abstract
Finding differences between programs with similar functionality is an important security problem as such differences can be used for fingerprinting or creating evasion attacks against security software like Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) which are designed to detect malicious inputs to web applications. In this paper, we present SFADIFF, a black-box differential testing framework based on Symbolic Finite Automata (SFA) learning. SFADIFF can automatically find differences between a set of programs with comparable functionality. Unlike existing differential testing techniques, instead of searching for each difference individually, SFADIFF infers SFA models of the target programs using black-box queries and systematically enumerates the differences between the inferred SFA models. All differences between the inferred models are checked against the corresponding programs. Any difference between the models, that does not result in a difference between the corresponding programs, is used as a counterexample for further refinement of the inferred models. SFADIFF's model-based approach, unlike existing differential testing tools, also support fully automated root cause analysis in a domain-independent manner.
George Argyros, Ioannis Stais, Suman Jana, Angelos D. Keromytis, Aggelos Kiayias
CCS2
2016 Back in Black: Towards Formal, Black Box Analysis of Sanitizers and Filters
abstract
We tackle the problem of analyzing filter and sanitizer programs remotely, i.e. given only the ability to query the targeted program and observe the output. We focus on two important and widely used program classes: regular expression (RE) filters and string sanitizers. We demonstrate that existing tools from machine learning that are available for analyzing RE filters, namely automata learning algorithms, require a very large number of queries in order to infer real life RE filters. Motivated by this, we develop the first algorithm that infers symbolic representations of automata in the standard membership/equivalence query model. We show that our algorithm provides an improvement of x15 times in the number of queries required to learn real life XSS and SQL filters of popular web application firewall systems such as mod-security and PHPIDS. % Active learning algorithms require the usage of an equivalence oracle, i.e. an oracle that tests the equivalence of a hypothesis with the target machine. We show that when the goal is to audit a target filter with respect to a set of attack strings from a context free grammar, i.e. find an attack or infer that none exists, we can use the attack grammar to implement the equivalence oracle with a single query to the filter. Our construction finds on average 90% of the target filter states when no attack exists and is very effective in finding attacks when they are present. For the case of string sanitizers, we show that existing algorithms for inferring sanitizers modelled as Mealy Machines are not only inefficient, but lack the expressive power to be able to infer real life sanitizers. We design two novel extensions to existing algorithms that allow one to infer sanitizers represented as single-valued transducers. Our algorithms are able to infer many common sanitizer functions such as HTML encoders and decoders. Furthermore, we design an algorithm to convert the inferred models into BEK programs, which allows for further applications such as cross checking different sanitizer implementations and cross compiling sanitizers into different languages supported by the BEK backend. We showcase the power of our techniques by utilizing our black-box inference algorithms to perform an equivalence checking between different HTML encoders including the encoders from Twitter, Facebook and Microsoft Outlook email, for which no implementation is publicly available.
George Argyros, Ioannis Stais, Aggelos Kiayias, Angelos D. Keromytis
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy2