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Siji Feng

dblp:184/6116 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
binary analysis
0.212016
SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016
Systems and software security
exploitation
0.212016
SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.212016
SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016
Program analysis › binary analysis
static binary analysis
0.112016
SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2016

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

symbolic execution · 0.5fuzzing · 0.5dynamic analysis · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2016 SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis
abstract
Finding and exploiting vulnerabilities in binary code is a challenging task. The lack of high-level, semantically rich information about data structures and control constructs makes the analysis of program properties harder to scale. However, the importance of binary analysis is on the rise. In many situations binary analysis is the only possible way to prove (or disprove) properties about the code that is actually executed. In this paper, we present a binary analysis framework that implements a number of analysis techniques that have been proposed in the past. We present a systematized implementation of these techniques, which allows other researchers to compose them and develop new approaches. In addition, the implementation of these techniques in a unifying framework allows for the direct comparison of these apporaches and the identification of their advantages and disadvantages. The evaluation included in this paper is performed using a recent dataset created by DARPA for evaluating the effectiveness of binary vulnerability analysis techniques. Our framework has been open-sourced and is available to the security community.
Yan Shoshitaishvili, Ruoyu Wang 0001, Christopher Salls, Nick Stephens, Mario Polino, Andrew Dutcher, John Grosen, Siji Feng, Christophe Hauser, Christopher Krügel, Giovanni Vigna
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy8