Security and privacy (S&P) advice plays a crucial role in how people stay safe online. While prior work shows that the plethora of advice from varied sources makes it difficult for users to prioritize advice, the insights are primarily based on studies conducted in Western contexts. Other work shows that users outside the West have different S&P needs and thus, we cannot simply rely on advice curated in the West to generalize to the majority world - regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, where most of the world's population lives. We fill this gap by investigating S&P advice across nine majority world countries via 70 semi-structured interviews with local experts: cybercafe operators, tech repair specialists, and other community figures that people commonly rely on for tech support and S&P advice. We find that the advice provided by local experts in the majority world largely matches the advice they provide to their constituents and the advice from the West. However, we surface various significant barriers that hinder majority world users from implementing advice, including economic constraints, language barriers, and social friction from taking protective measures. Our findings further show how factors such as social norms and gender shape advice practices, e.g., by driving gendered advice-seeking. We discuss how S&P advice in the majority world can be improved and reflect on how the S&P community can better engage with local communities in conducting similar research.

Uniswap v3 is the largest decentralized exchange for digital currencies. A novelty of its design is that it allows a liquidity provider (LP) to allocate liquidity to one or more closed intervals of the price of an asset instead of the full range of possible prices. An LP earns fee rewards proportional to the amount of its liquidity allocation when prices move in this interval. This induces the problem of strategic liquidity provision: smaller intervals result in higher concentration of liquidity and correspondingly larger fees when the price remains in the interval, but with higher risk as prices may exit the interval leaving the LP with no fee rewards. Although reallocating liquidity to new intervals can mitigate this loss, it comes at a cost, as LPs must expend gas fees to do so. We formalize the dynamic liquidity provision problem and focus on a general class of strategies for which we provide a neural network-based optimization framework for maximizing LP earnings. We model a single LP that faces an exogenous sequence of price changes that arise from arbitrage and non-arbitrage trades in the decentralized exchange. We present experimental results informed by historical price data that demonstrate large improvements in LP earnings over existing allocation strategy baselines. Moreover we provide insight into qualitative differences in optimal LP behaviour in different economic environments.

In an epidemic, how should an organization with limited testing resources safely return to in-person activities after a lockdown? We study this question in a setting where the population is heterogeneous in both utility for in-person activities and probability of infection. During a period of re-integration, tests can be used as a certificate of non-infection, whereby those in negative tests are permitted to return to in-person activities for a designated amount of time. Under the assumption that samples can be pooled, the question of how to allocate a limited testing budget in the population to maximize the aggregate utility (i.e. welfare) of negatively-tested individuals who return to in-person activities is non-trivial, with a large space of potential testing allocations.

Recent results have shown that algorithms for learning the optimal commitment in a Stackelberg game are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. These learning algorithms operate by querying the best responses of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by using fake best responses, typically by responding according to fake payoffs that are different from the actual ones. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the fake payoffs that would make the learning algorithm output a commitment that benefits them the most. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature has only focused on a simple setting where the follower can only choose from a finite set of payoff matrices, thus leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill this gap by showing that it is always possible for the follower to efficiently compute (near-)optimal fake payoffs, for various scenarios of learning interaction between the leader and the follower. Our results also establish an interesting connection between the follower’s deception and the leader’s maximin utility: through deception, the follower can induce almost any (fake) Stackelberg equilibrium if and only if the leader obtains at least their maximin utility in this equilibrium.

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm operates by querying the best responses or the payoffs of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by responding as if their payoffs were much different than what they actually are. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm compute a commitment so that best responding to it maximizes the follower's utility, according to the true payoffs. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature only focused on the simplified scenario in which the payoff space is finite, thus leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill this gap by showing that it is always possible for the follower to efficiently compute (near-)optimal payoffs for various scenarios of learning interaction between the leader and the follower.

The Bitcoin protocol prescribes certain behavior by the miners who are responsible for maintaining and extending the underlying blockchain; in particular, miners who successfully solve a puzzle, and hence can extend the chain by a block, are supposed to release that block immediately. Eyal and Sirer showed, however, that a selfish miner is incentivized to deviate from the protocol and withhold its blocks under certain conditions.

We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for “large” n-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player’s utility is greatly affected by any other individual player’s actions. In this paper, we mostly focus on the case where any change of strategy by a player causes other players’ payoffs to change by at most $\frac {1}{n}$ . We study algorithms having query access to the game’s payoff function, aiming to find ε-Nash equilibria. We seek algorithms that obtain ε as small as possible, in time polynomial in n. Our main result is a randomised algorithm that achieves ε approaching $\frac {1}{8}$ for 2-strategy games in a completely uncoupled setting, where each player observes her own payoff to a query, and adjusts her behaviour independently of other players’ payoffs/actions. O(log n) rounds/queries are required. We also show how to obtain a slight improvement over $\frac {1}{8}$ , by introducing a small amount of communication between the players. Finally, we give extension of our results to large games with more than two strategies per player, and alternative largeness parameters.