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Katja Miller

dblp:185/6237 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.312018
DATA - Differential Address Trace Analysis: Finding Address-based Side-Channels in Binaries · USENIX Security Symposium 2018
Program analysis
binary analysis
0.112018
DATA - Differential Address Trace Analysis: Finding Address-based Side-Channels in Binaries · USENIX Security Symposium 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

dynamic analysis · 0.7differential address trace analysis · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Locked out by Latch-up? An Empirical Study on Laser Fault Injection into Arm Cortex-M Processors
abstract
Laser-based fault injection (LFI) is considered as one of the most powerful tools for active attacks against integrated circuits. However, only few empirical results are published for LFI into modern low-power microcontrollers with current process technologies. To fill this gap, we investigate LFI in four Cortex-M microcontrollers from different manufacturers: ST Microelectronics, NXP and Infineon. We note that those controllers differ from the ones used in high-security smartcard devices but argue that they are possibly built in similar process technologies making our results relevant for security evaluations. We were able to successfully inject precise faults into either the SRAM or the register file in all tested devices. We report our settings and fault maps in order to facilitate further fault attack investigations on these microcontrollers. As another contribution, we would like to emphasize the significant difficulties we encountered in some measurements due to the occurrence of latch-up effects. In many cases, the latch-up behavior of the integrated circuit prevented successful fault injections. This observation is largely underrepresented in scientific publications, which leads to an overestimation of the effectiveness of laser-based fault injection attacks under realistic circumstances.
Bodo Selmke, Kilian Zinnecker, Philipp Koppermann, Katja Miller, Johann Heyszl, Georg Sigl
FDTC4
2018 DATA - Differential Address Trace Analysis: Finding Address-based Side-Channels in Binaries
Samuel Weiser, Andreas Zankl, Raphael Spreitzer, Katja Miller, Stefan Mangard, Georg Sigl
USENIX Security Symposium4
2016 Towards Efficient Evaluation of a Time-Driven Cache Attack on Modern Processors
Andreas Zankl, Katja Miller, Johann Heyszl, Georg Sigl
ESORICS (2)2