This paper presents Protected Execution Facility (PEF), a virtual machine-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for confidential computing on Power ISA. PEF enables protected secure virtual machines (SVMs). Like other TEEs, PEF verifies the SVM prior to execution. PEF utilizes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), secure boot, and trusted boot as well as newly introduced architectural changes for Power ISA systems. Exploiting these architectural changes requires new firmware, the Protected Execution Ultravisor. PEF is supported in the latest version of the POWER9 chip. PEF demonstrates that access control for isolation and cryptography for confidentiality is an effective approach to confidential computing. We particularly focus on how our design (i) balances between access control and cryptography, (ii) maximizes the use of existing security components, and (iii) simplifies the management of the SVM life cycle. Finally, we evaluate the performance of SVMs in comparison to normal virtual machines on OpenPOWER systems.

Read-copy update (RCU) can provide ideal scalability for read-mostly workloads, but some believe that it provides only poor performance for updates. This belief is due to the lack of RCU-centric update synchronization mechanisms. RCU instead works with a range of update-side mechanisms, such as locking. In fact, many developers embrace simplicity by using global locking. Logging, hardware transactional memory, or fine-grained locking can provide better scalability, but each of these approaches has limitations, such as imposing overhead on readers or poor scalability on non-uniform memory access (NUMA) systems, mainly due to their lack of NUMA-aware design principles.