EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Bohdan Trach
dblp:189/0114
· DBLP profile ↗
9ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 6 · 2 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
5 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 66% Systems and software security · 24% Authentication and access control · 10% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Parallel and multicore computing · 76% Storage systems · 19% Cloud and datacenter computing · 6% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers |
Software testing · 64% Operating systems · 36% |
Topics — the 14 heaviest of 15, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.9 | 3 | 2018 | Varys: Protecting SGX Enclaves from Practical Side-Channel Attacks · USENIX ATC 2018 SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution · EuroSys 2017 SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX · OSDI 2016 |
Parallel and multicore computing
parallel programming models |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | BWoS: Formally Verified Block-based Work Stealing for Parallel Processing · OSDI 2023 |
Parallel and multicore computing › load balancing › dynamic load balancing
work stealing |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | BWoS: Formally Verified Block-based Work Stealing for Parallel Processing · OSDI 2023 |
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
Intel SGX |
0.5 | 2 | 2017 | SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution · EuroSys 2017 SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX · OSDI 2016 |
Hardware security and side channels › side channel
speculative execution vulnerabilities |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | SpecFuzz: Bringing Spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | SpecFuzz: Bringing Spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Authentication and access control
access control |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Pesos: policy enhanced secure object store · EuroSys 2018 |
Storage systems
secure storage |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Pesos: policy enhanced secure object store · EuroSys 2018 |
Systems and software security
memory safety |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution · EuroSys 2017 |
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
shielded execution |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution · EuroSys 2017 |
Software testing
fuzzing |
0.1 | 1 | 2020 | SpecFuzz: Bringing Spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Systems and software security › trusted computing
enclave security |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Varys: Protecting SGX Enclaves from Practical Side-Channel Attacks · USENIX ATC 2018 |
Hardware security and side channels › hardware attacks
side-channel and fault attacks |
0.1 | 1 | 2017 | SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution · EuroSys 2017 |
Operating systems › virtualization
containers |
0.1 | 1 | 2016 | SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX · OSDI 2016 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
formal verification · 1.3block-based scheduling · 1.3sanitizers · 0.9fuzzing · 0.9i/o mediation · 0.7declarative policy language · 0.7memory-safety enforcement · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | BWoS: Formally Verified Block-based Work Stealing for Parallel Processing
Bohdan Trach, Ming Fu, Diogo Behrens, Jonathan Schwender, Jitang Lei, Viktor Vafeiadis, Hermann Härtig, Haibo Chen 0001 |
OSDI | 2 |
| 2020 | T-Lease: a trusted lease primitive for distributed systemsabstractA lease is an important primitive for building distributed protocols, and it is ubiquitously employed in distributed systems. However, the scope of the classic lease abstraction is restricted to the trusted computing infrastructure. Unfortunately, this important primitive cannot be employed in the untrusted computing infrastructure because the trusted execution environments (TEEs) do not provide a trusted time source. In the untrusted environment, an adversary can easily manipulate the system clock to violate the correctness properties of lease-based systems. Bohdan Trach, Rasha Faqeh, Oleksii Oleksenko, Wojciech Ozga, Pramod Bhatotia, Christof Fetzer |
SoCC | 1 |
| 2020 | SpecFuzz: Bringing Spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface
Oleksii Oleksenko, Bohdan Trach, Mark Silberstein, Christof Fetzer |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |
| 2019 | Clemmys: towards secure remote execution in FaaSabstractWe introduce Clemmys, a security-first serverless platform that ensures confidentiality and integrity of users' functions and data as they are processed on untrusted cloud premises, while keeping the cost of protection low. We provide a design for hardening FaaS platforms with Intel SGX---a hardware-based shielded execution technology. We explain the protocol that our system uses to ensure confidentiality and integrity of data, and integrity of function chains. To overcome performance and latency issues that are inherent in SGX applications, we apply several SGX-specific optimizations to the runtime system: we use SGXv2 to speed up the enclave startup and perform batch EPC augmentation. To evaluate our approach, we implement our design over Apache Open-Whisk, a popular serverless platform. Lastly, we show that Clemmys achieved same throughput and similar latency as native Apache OpenWhisk, while allowing it to withstand several new attack vectors. Bohdan Trach, Oleksii Oleksenko, Franz Gregor, Pramod Bhatotia, Christof Fetzer |
SYSTOR | 1 |
| 2018 | Pesos: policy enhanced secure object storeabstractThird-party storage services pose the risk of integrity and confidentiality violations as the current storage policy enforcement mechanisms are spread across many layers in the system stack. To mitigate these security vulnerabilities, we present the design and implementation of Pesos, a Policy Enhanced Secure Object Store (Pesos) for untrusted third-party storage providers. Pesos allows clients to specify per-object security policies, concisely and separately from the storage stack, and enforces these policies by securely mediating the I/O in the persistence layer through a single unified enforcement layer. More broadly, Pesos exposes a rich set of storage policies ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and access accounting for data storage through a declarative policy language. Robert Krahn, Bohdan Trach, Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Thomas Knauth, Pramod Bhatotia, Christof Fetzer |
EuroSys | 2 |
| 2018 | Varys: Protecting SGX Enclaves from Practical Side-Channel Attacks
Oleksii Oleksenko, Bohdan Trach, Robert Krahn, Mark Silberstein, Christof Fetzer |
USENIX ATC | 2 |
| 2017 | SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded ExecutionabstractShielded execution based on Intel SGX provides strong security guarantees for legacy applications running on untrusted platforms. However, memory safety attacks such as Heartbleed can render the confidentiality and integrity properties of shielded execution completely ineffective. To prevent these attacks, the state-of-the-art memory-safety approaches can be used in the context of shielded execution. Dmitrii Kuvaiskii, Oleksii Oleksenko, Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Pramod Bhatotia, Pascal Felber, Christof Fetzer |
EuroSys | 4 |
| 2017 | FFQ: A Fast Single-Producer/Multiple-Consumer Concurrent FIFO QueueabstractWith the spreading of multi-core architectures, operating systems and applications are becoming increasingly more concurrent and their scalability is often limited by the primitives used to synchronize the different hardware threads. In this paper, we address the problem of how to optimize the throughput of a system with multiple producer and consumer threads. Such applications typically synchronize their threads via multi-producer/multi-consumer FIFO queues, but existing solutions have poor scalability, as we could observe when designing a secure application framework that requires high-throughput communication between many concurrent threads. In our target system, however, the items enqueued by different producers do not necessarily need to be FIFO ordered. Hence, we propose a fast FIFO queue, FFQ, that aims at maximizing throughput by specializing the algorithm for single-producer/multiple-consumer settings: each producer has its own queue from which multiple consumers can concurrently dequeue. Furthermore, while we provide a wait-free interface for producers, we limit ourselves to lock-free consumers to eliminate the need for helping. We also propose a multi-producer variant to show which synchronization operations we were able to remove by focusing on a single producer variant. Our evaluation analyses the performance using micro-benchmarks and compares our results with other state-of-the-art solutions: FFQ exhibits excellent performance and scalability. Sergei Arnautov, Pascal Felber, Christof Fetzer, Bohdan Trach |
IPDPS | 4 |
| 2016 | SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX
Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Franz Gregor, Thomas Knauth, André Martin, Christian Priebe, Joshua Lind, Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O'Keeffe, Mark Stillwell, David Goltzsche, David M. Eyers, Rüdiger Kapitza, Peter R. Pietzuch, Christof Fetzer |
OSDI | 2 |