Intrinsic motivation and reward shaping guide reinforcement learning (RL) agents by adding pseudo-rewards, which can lead to useful emergent behaviors. However, they can also encourage counterproductive exploits, e.g., fixation with noisy TV screens. Here we provide a theoretical model which anticipates these behaviors, and provides broad criteria under which adverse effects can be bounded. We characterize all pseudo-rewards as reward shaping in Bayes-Adaptive Markov Decision Processes (BAMDPs), which formulates the problem of learning in MDPs as an MDP over the agent's knowledge. Optimal exploration maximizes BAMDP state value, which we decompose into the value of the information gathered and the prior value of the physical state. Psuedo-rewards guide RL agents by rewarding behavior that increases these value components, while they hinder exploration when they align poorly with the actual value. We extend potential-based shaping theory to prove BAMDP Potential-based shaping Functions (BAMPFs) are immune to reward-hacking (convergence to behaviors maximizing composite rewards to the detriment of real rewards) in meta-RL, and show empirically how a BAMPF helps a meta-RL agent learn optimal RL algorithms for a Bernoulli Bandit domain. We finally prove that BAMPFs with bounded monotone increasing potentials also resist reward-hacking in the regular RL setting. We show that it is straightforward to retrofit or design new pseudo-reward terms in this form, and provide an empirical demonstration in the Mountain Car environment.

While Generative AI rapidly advances in various domains, generating truly creative, aesthetic, and counter-intuitive outputs remains a challenge. This paper presents an approach to tackle these difficulties in the domain of chess puzzles. We start by benchmarking Generative AI architectures, and then introduce an RL framework with novel rewards based on chess engine search statistics to overcome some of those shortcomings. The rewards are designed to enhance a puzzle's uniqueness, counter-intuitiveness, diversity, and realism. Our RL approach dramatically increases counter-intuitive puzzle generation by 10x, from 0.22\% (supervised) to 2.5\%, surpassing existing dataset rates (2.1\%) and the best Lichess-trained model (0.4\%). Our puzzles meet novelty and diversity benchmarks, retain aesthetic themes, and are rated by human experts as more creative, enjoyable, and counter-intuitive than composed book puzzles, even approaching classic compositions. Our final outcome is a curated booklet of these novel AI-generated puzzles, which is acknowledged for creativity by three world-renowned experts.

Adversarial optimization algorithms that explicitly search for flaws in agents' policies have been successfully applied to finding robust and diverse policies in the context of multi-agent learning. However, the success of adversarial optimization has been largely limited to zero-sum settings because its naive application in cooperative settings leads to a critical failure mode: agents are irrationally incentivized to *self-sabotage*, blocking the completion of tasks and halting further learning. To address this, we introduce *Rationality-preserving Policy Optimization (RPO)*, a formalism for adversarial optimization that avoids self-sabotage by ensuring agents remain *rational*—that is, their policies are optimal with respect to some possible partner policy. To solve RPO, we develop *Rational Policy Gradient (RPG)*, which trains agents to maximize their own reward in a modified version of the original game in which we use *opponent shaping* techniques to optimize the adversarial objective. RPG enables us to extend a variety of existing adversarial optimization algorithms that, no longer subject to the limitations of self-sabotage, can find adversarial examples, improve robustness and adaptability, and learn diverse policies. We empirically validate that our approach achieves strong performance in several popular cooperative and general-sum environments. Our project page can be found at https://rational-policy-gradient.github.io.

In recent years there has been a tremendous surge in the general capabilities of AI systems, mainly fuelled by training foundation models on internet-scale data. Nevertheless, the creation of open-ended, ever self-improving AI remains elusive. **In this position paper, we argue that the ingredients are now in place to achieve *open-endedness* in AI systems with respect to a human observer. Furthermore, we claim that such open-endedness is an essential property of any artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI).** We begin by providing a concrete formal definition of open-endedness through the lens of novelty and learnability. We then illustrate a path towards ASI via open-ended systems built on top of foundation models, capable of making novel, human-relevant discoveries. We conclude by examining the safety implications of generally-capable open-ended AI. We expect that open-ended foundation models will prove to be an increasingly fertile and safety-critical area of research in the near future.

In unsupervised environment design, reinforcement learning agents are trained on environment configurations (levels) generated by an adversary that maximises some objective. Regret is a commonly used objective that theoretically results in a minimax regret (MMR) policy with desirable robustness guarantees; in particular, the agent’s maximum regret is bounded. However, once the agent reaches this regret bound on all levels, the adversary will only sample levels where regret cannot be further reduced. Although there may be possible performance improvements to be made outside of these regret-maximising levels, learning stagnates. In this work, we introduce Bayesian level-perfect MMR (BLP), a refinement of the minimax regret objective that overcomes this limitation. We formally show that solving for this objective results in a subset of MMR policies, and that BLP policies act consistently with a Perfect Bayesian policy over all levels. We further introduce an algorithm, ReMiDi, that results in a BLP policy at convergence. We empirically demonstrate that training on levels from a minimax regret adversary causes learning to prematurely stagnate, but that ReMiDi continues learning.

We introduce Genie, the first *generative interactive environment* trained in an unsupervised manner from unlabelled Internet videos. The model can be prompted to generate an endless variety of action-controllable virtual worlds described through text, synthetic images, photographs, and even sketches. At 11B parameters, Genie can be considered a *foundation world model*. It is comprised of a spatiotemporal video tokenizer, an autoregressive dynamics model, and a simple and scalable latent action model. Genie enables users to act in the generated environments on a frame-by-frame basis *despite training without any ground-truth action labels* or other domain specific requirements typically found in the world model literature. Further the resulting learned latent action space facilitates training agents to imitate behaviors from unseen videos, opening the path for training generalist agents of the future.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one’s collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We attack the state-of-the-art Go-playing AI system KataGo by training adversarial policies against it, achieving a $>$97% win rate against KataGo running at superhuman settings. Our adversaries do not win by playing Go well. Instead, they trick KataGo into making serious blunders. Our attack transfers zero-shot to other superhuman Go-playing AIs, and is comprehensible to the extent that human experts can implement it without algorithmic assistance to consistently beat superhuman AIs. The core vulnerability uncovered by our attack persists even in KataGo agents adversarially trained to defend against our attack. Our results demonstrate that even superhuman AI systems may harbor surprising failure modes. Example games are available https://goattack.far.ai/.

Training generally-capable agents with reinforcement learning (RL) remains a significant challenge. A promising avenue for improving the robustness of RL agents is through the use of curricula. One such class of methods frames environment design as a game between a student and a teacher, using regret-based objectives to produce environment instantiations (or levels) at the frontier of the student agent’s capabilities. These methods benefit from theoretical robustness guarantees at equilibrium, yet they often struggle to find effective levels in challenging design spaces in practice. By contrast, evolutionary approaches incrementally alter environment complexity, resulting in potentially open-ended learning, but often rely on domain-specific heuristics and vast amounts of computational resources. This work proposes harnessing the power of evolution in a principled, regret-based curriculum. Our approach, which we call Adversarially Compounding Complexity by Editing Levels (ACCEL), seeks to constantly produce levels at the frontier of an agent’s capabilities, resulting in curricula that start simple but become increasingly complex. ACCEL maintains the theoretical benefits of prior regret-based methods, while providing significant empirical gains in a diverse set of environments. An interactive version of this paper is available at https://accelagent.github.io.

Adaptive curricula in reinforcement learning (RL) have proven effective for producing policies robust to discrepancies between the train and test environment. Recently, the Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) framework generalized RL curricula to generating sequences of entire environments, leading to new methods with robust minimax regret properties. Problematically, in partially-observable or stochastic settings, optimal policies may depend on the ground-truth distribution over aleatoric parameters of the environment in the intended deployment setting, while curriculum learning necessarily shifts the training distribution. We formalize this phenomenon as curriculum-induced covariate shift (CICS), and describe how its occurrence in aleatoric parameters can lead to suboptimal policies. Directly sampling these parameters from the ground-truth distribution avoids the issue, but thwarts curriculum learning. We propose SAMPLR, a minimax regret UED method that optimizes the ground-truth utility function, even when the underlying training data is biased due to CICS. We prove, and validate on challenging domains, that our approach preserves optimality under the ground-truth distribution, while promoting robustness across the full range of environment settings.

In many coordination problems, independently reasoning humans are able to discover mutually compatible policies. In contrast, independently trained self-play policies are often mutually incompatible. Zero-shot coordination (ZSC) has recently been proposed as a new frontier in multi-agent reinforcement learning to address this fundamental issue. Prior work approaches the ZSC problem by assuming players can agree on a shared learning algorithm but not on labels for actions and observations, and proposes other-play as an optimal solution. However, until now, this “label-free” problem has only been informally defined. We formalize this setting as the label-free coordination (LFC) problem by defining the label-free coordination game. We show that other-play is not an optimal solution to the LFC problem as it fails to consistently break ties between incompatible maximizers of the other-play objective. We introduce an extension of the algorithm, other-play with tie-breaking, and prove that it is optimal in the LFC problem and an equilibrium in the LFC game. Since arbitrary tie-breaking is precisely what the ZSC setting aims to prevent, we conclude that the LFC problem does not reflect the aims of ZSC. To address this, we introduce an alternative informal operationalization of ZSC as a starting point for future work.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) agents may successfully generalize to new settings if trained on an appropriately diverse set of environment and task configurations. Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) is a promising self-supervised RL paradigm, wherein the free parameters of an underspecified environment are automatically adapted during training to the agent's capabilities, leading to the emergence of diverse training environments. Here, we cast Prioritized Level Replay (PLR), an empirically successful but theoretically unmotivated method that selectively samples randomly-generated training levels, as UED. We argue that by curating completely random levels, PLR, too, can generate novel and complex levels for effective training. This insight reveals a natural class of UED methods we call Dual Curriculum Design (DCD). Crucially, DCD includes both PLR and a popular UED algorithm, PAIRED, as special cases and inherits similar theoretical guarantees. This connection allows us to develop novel theory for PLR, providing a version with a robustness guarantee at Nash equilibria. Furthermore, our theory suggests a highly counterintuitive improvement to PLR: by stopping the agent from updating its policy on uncurated levels (training on less data), we can improve the convergence to Nash equilibria. Indeed, our experiments confirm that our new method, PLR$^{\perp}$, obtains better results on a suite of out-of-distribution, zero-shot transfer tasks, in addition to demonstrating that PLR$^{\perp}$ improves the performance of PAIRED, from which it inherited its theoretical framework.

The problem of computing the exact stretch factor (i.e., the tight bound on the worst case stretch factor) of a Delaunay triangulation is one of the longstanding open problems in computational geometry. Over the years, a series of upper and lower bounds on the exact stretch factor have been obtained but the gap between them is still large. An alternative approach to solving the problem is to develop techniques for computing the exact stretch factor of "easier" types of Delaunay triangulations, in particular those defined using regular-polygons instead of a circle. Tight bounds exist for Delaunay triangulations defined using an equilateral triangle and a square. In this paper, we determine the exact stretch factor of Delaunay triangulations defined using a regular hexagon: It is 2. We think that the main contribution of this paper are the two techniques we have developed to compute tight upper bounds for the stretch factor of Hexagon-Delaunay triangulations.

A wide range of reinforcement learning (RL) problems --- including robustness, transfer learning, unsupervised RL, and emergent complexity --- require specifying a distribution of tasks or environments in which a policy will be trained. However, creating a useful distribution of environments is error prone, and takes a significant amount of developer time and effort. We propose Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) as an alternative paradigm, where developers provide environments with unknown parameters, and these parameters are used to automatically produce a distribution over valid, solvable environments. Existing approaches to automatically generating environments suffer from common failure modes: domain randomization cannot generate structure or adapt the difficulty of the environment to the agent's learning progress, and minimax adversarial training leads to worst-case environments that are often unsolvable. To generate structured, solvable environments for our protagonist agent, we introduce a second, antagonist agent that is allied with the environment-generating adversary. The adversary is motivated to generate environments which maximize regret, defined as the difference between the protagonist and antagonist agent's return. We call our technique Protagonist Antagonist Induced Regret Environment Design (PAIRED). Our experiments demonstrate that PAIRED produces a natural curriculum of increasingly complex environments, and PAIRED agents achieve higher zero-shot transfer performance when tested in highly novel environments.